The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism

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Clarendon Press, Sep 6, 2007 - Philosophy - 263 pages
Antirealist views about morality claim that moral facts or truths do not exist. Does this imply that other types of normative facts, such as epistemic facts, do not exist? The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. Terence Cuneo argues that moral and epistemic facts are
sufficiently similar so that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist. But epistemic facts do exist: to deny their existence would commit us to an extreme version of epistemological scepticism. Therefore, Cuneo concludes, moral facts do exist. And if moral facts exist, then
moral realism is true.

It is sometimes said that moral realists rarely offer arguments for their position, settling instead for mere defenses of a view they find intuitively plausible. By contrast, The Normative Web provides not merely a defense of robust realism in ethics, but a positive argument for this position. In so
doing, it engages with a range of antirealist positions in epistemology such as error theories, expressivist views, and reductionist views of epistemic reasons. These positions, Cuneo claims, come at a prohibitively high theoretical cost. Given this cost, it follows that realism about both epistemic
and moral facts is a position that we should find highly attractive.

 

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Contents

Introduction
1
Moral Realism of a Paradigmatic Sort
20
Defending the Parallel
52
The Parity Premise
89
Epistemic Nihilism
115
Epistemic Expressivism Traditional Views
124
Epistemic Expressivism Nontraditional Views
145
Epistemic Reductionism
185
Three Objections to the Core Argument
224
Bibliography
248
Index
261
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About the author (2007)

Terence Cuneo is at Calvin College, Michigan.

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