Regulation in the Regan-Bush Era: The Eruption of Presidential Influence

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University of Pittsburgh Pre, May 1, 1995 - Political Science - 272 pages
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This timely and well-researched study describes for the first time the astonishing acquiescence of executive agency officials, members of Congress, and federal judges to Ronald Regan's assertion of extraordinary new presidential power over the federal regulatory process--the controversial Executive Order 12291.

From Harry Truman through Jimmy Carter, chief executives complained that federal bureaucrats disregarded their policy preferences. presidential influence over regulatory rule making was limited: congressional committees and interest groups commanded more attention. Then in February 1981 Ronald Reagan abruptly departed from tradition by ordering that regulatory agencies must submit proposed guidelines for Office of Management and Budget approval.

Barry D. Friedman describes how the executive agencies and Congress responded warily and with skepticism, yet allowed the changes to remain; the judiciary was also willing to retreat from time-honored precedents that had preserved agency prerogative and now accorded due respect to the revolutionary Regan reform initiatives. Institutions that competed for leverage in the system continued to exercise restraint in their mutual relations because they recognized that all benefited from the others' viability.

This book shows that conventional political science theories and models are now obsolete because of the eruption of presidential control into bureaucratic affairs. new review procedures have restructured relations between the president and the agencies and among the government's three branches. because of Regan's radical initiative, President Bill Clinton and his successors will sit at the bargaining table when regulation policy is developed in Washington, and political theorists will have to work from a new conception of presidential prerogative.
 

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Contents

Introduction
3
1 Regulation
7
2 The Regulatory Oversight Role of the Presidency and Vice Presidency
20
3 Processes of Regulatory Relief
43
4 Concerns About Implementation
59
5 The Executive Agencies
76
6 Congresss Involvemnet in Regulation and Reform
106
7 Judicial Reaction to Presidential Control
122
10 Regulatory Review After Reagan
160
11 Theoretical Frameworks
179
Conclusion
193
Notes
197
References
243
Index
253
Spine
262
Back Cover
263

8 Three Case Studies
134
9 Implications for Regulatory Reform
149

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About the author (1995)

Barry D. Friedman is  professor of political science and criminal justice at North Georgia College & State University.

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