The Political Economy of Pension Policy Reversal in Post-Communist CountriesWhy do governments backtrack on major policy reforms? Reversals of pension privatization provide insight into why governments abandon potentially path-departing policy changes. Academics and policymakers will find this work relevant in understanding market-oriented reform, authoritarian and post-communist politics, and the politics of aging populations. The clear presentation and multi-method approach make the findings broadly accessible in understanding social security reform, an issue of increasing importance around the world. Survival analysis using global data is complemented by detailed case studies of reversal in Russia, Hungary, and Poland including original survey data. The findings support an innovative argument countering the conventional wisdom that more extensive reforms are more likely to survive. Indeed, governments pursuing moderate reform - neither the least nor most extensive reformers - were the most likely to retract. This lends insight into the stickiness of many social and economic reforms, calling for more attention to which reforms are reversible and which, as a result, may ultimately be detrimental. |
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Contents
Backtracking on Pension Privatization Around | 20 |
A Theory of Policy Reversal | 47 |
reversal | 75 |
Overview of Case Studies | 101 |
1 | 124 |
Russian Domestic Stakeholders and Backtracking | 142 |
Hungary | 166 |
The Importance of Understanding Pension Policy Reversal | 221 |
235 | |
249 | |
Other editions - View all
The Political Economy of Pension Policy Reversal in Post-Communist Countries Sarah Wilson Sokhey No preview available - 2020 |
Common terms and phrases
accumulative portion adoption of pension Argentina backtracking backtracking on pension Bank’s benefits Bulgaria bureaucratic changes citizens Civic Platform costs debates deficit guidelines degree of pension degree of reform domestic stakeholders elections Estonia European Union expectations explain extensive pension privatization Fidesz financial crisis financing gap fiscal pressures Fund’s government’s Hungarian Hungarian government Hungary Hungary’s implicit pension debt important individual accounts influence interest groups investors Kazakhstan left-wing legislation long-term market-oriented reforms measures moderate degree Moscow MSzP option partial partisanship PAYG system pension policy pension privatiza pension reform percent Poland policy diffusion policymakers Polish government politicians portion of pensions post-communist countries potential private pension funds private pension sector privatized pension system privatized system pursued Putin retirement reversal of pension reversing pension privatization right-wing governments role Russia Russian government Russian pension second tier short-term revenue sion privatization Slovakia social contract social security survival tion United Russia vatization World Bank