Metaphysics of Consciousness
Metaphysics of Consciousness opens with a development of the physicalist outlook that denies the need for any explanation of the mental. This "inexplicability" is demonstrated not to be sufficient as refutation of physicalism. However, the inescapable particularity of modes of consciousness appears to overpower this minimal physicalism. This book proposes that such an inference requires either a wholly new conception of how consciousness is physical or a deep and disturbing new kind of physical inexplicability.
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POSITIVE REDUCTIVE STRATEGIES
NEGATIVE REDUCTIVE STRATEGIES
VARIETIES OF SUPERVENIENCE
CONSCIOUSNESS AND CAUSAL EFFICACY
RECONCILIATION AND MYSTERY
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accept appeal argument behaviour brain causal causal powers causally efficacious cause chapter Churchland claim cognitive colour complex condition connectionism connectionist constitutive supervenience correlative supervenience correspondence principles counterfactual course Davidson demand Dennett Descartes determined diagonal closure disjunctive distinct doctrine efficacious properties eliminative materialism Eliminative Materialist emergentism entities environment epiphenomenalism example experience explicable fact Fodor folk psychology functional architecture functionalist global supervenience ground identifying explanations identity imagine individual inexplicability instantiating instrumentalist interpretation intuitions least mental mind mind-brain relation modes of consciousness nature non-physical notion objection ontological unity particular Paul Churchland perhaps phenomena philosophers philosophy of mind physical description physical events physical law physical properties physical resolution physicalist physically possible worlds plausible predict problem psychological ascription psychological characterization psychological properties qualia question realization reason reduction relevant scientific seems sort strong supervenience structure suppose token-identity theory type-identity theory weak supervenience William Lycan