Securing Approval: Domestic Politics & Multilateral Authorization for War

Front Cover
University of Chicago Press, Jul 24, 2012 - Political Science - 204 pages

Among the most momentous decisions that leaders of a state are called upon to make is whether or not to initiate warfare. How their military will fare against the opponent may be the first consideration, but not far behind are concerns about domestic political response and the reaction of the international community.


Securing Approval makes clear the relationship between these two seemingly distinct concerns, demonstrating how multilateral security organizations like the UN influence foreign policy through public opinion without ever exercising direct enforcement power. While UN approval of a proposed action often bolsters public support, its refusal of endorsement may conversely send a strong signal to domestic audiences that the action will be exceedingly costly or overly aggressive. With a cogent theoretical and empirical argument, Terrence L. Chapman provides new evidence for how multilateral organizations matter in security affairs as well as a new way of thinking about the design and function of these institutions.

 

Contents

List of Illustrations
1
2
3
4
5
Conclusion
References
Index
Copyright

Other editions - View all

Securing Approval: Domestic Politics and Multilateral Authorization for War
Terrence L. Chapman
Limited preview - 2011
Securing Approval: Domestic Politics and Multilateral Authorization for War
Terrence L. Chapman
No preview available - 2011

Common terms and phrases

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About the author (2012)

Terrence L. Chapman is assistant professor in the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin.

Bibliographic information

TitleSecuring Approval: Domestic Politics & Multilateral Authorization for War
Chicago Series on International and Domestic Institutions
AuthorTerrence L. Chapman
Editionunabridged
PublisherUniversity of Chicago Press, 2012
ISBN0226101258, 9780226101255
Length204 pages
Subjects ›  › 

Political Science / American Government / Legislative Branch
Political Science / International Relations / Diplomacy
  
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