Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics
Clearly written and easily understood by the nonspecialist, Nested Games provides a systematic, empirically accurate, and theoretically coherent account of apparently irrational political actions.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
In Defense of the RationalChoice Approach
TwoPerson Games with Variable Payoffs
Games with Variable Rules or the Politics of Institutional
Why Do British Labour Party Activists Commit Political
A RationalChoice Approach to Consociationalism
Other editions - View all
activists ALLD argue argument assurance game behavior candidate Chapter chicken game choose coalition cohesion Communists competition conflict considered consociational constituency level contingent strategies correlated strategies defection dilemma game efficient institutions Egmont Pact election electoral system empirical equilibrium example explain Figure folk theorem four games French Fifth Republic game of chicken game theory games in multiple Graphic representation important increases indicates individual institutional design interaction intransigence issues iterated games Labour party leaders Left likelihood of cooperation majority marginal ment moderate multiple arenas mutual cooperation Nash equilibrium nested games opponent optimal outcome Pareto Pareto optimal Pareto set partners payoff matrix players political actors political elites possible preferences principal arena prisoners probability problem propositions 3.6 rational-choice approach reasons redistributive institutions represents reselection game rules seat second round Section situation social Socialists subgame suboptimal theoretical tion trade unions TRMES variable victory voters