Welfare standards and merger analysis: why not the best?
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Division, 2006 - Business & Economics - 24 pages
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American Economic Review antitrust agencies Antitrust Defense Antitrust Division Antitrust Law Journal argue Arnold Harberger auto Firm better Clayton Act cognizable efficiencies competition authorities consider consumer surplus consumer welfare standard demand Department of Justice differentiated products distributional consequences economists effect on consumers efficiencies defense employing a consumer employing a total enhance estimate example explicitly final consumers Firm B's plant firm's fixed cost savings harm Horizontal Merger Guidelines impact implications increase incumbents individuals inputs investments less line of commerce lower prices marginal cost savings maximize merger analysis merger policy merger-generated merger-specific efficiencies merger's likely effects merging firms merging parties Michael Spence Monopolistic Competition monopsony Neelie Kroes oligopoly Oliver Williamson Pareto Consumer Welfare pass-through potentially pre-merger Product Differentiation profitable prosecutorial discretion reduce competition reduction in marginal relevant market Richard Posner Salop simply standpoint of society substantial total welfare standard U.S. Department views of customers Welfare Economics welfare of consumers