Economics, Organization, and ManagementWe have organized the text into seven parts. The first deals with the fundamental problems of economic organization, namely those of coordinating and motivating the members of an organization to work in ways that are coherent and advance the common interests of the organization's members. Part II is about coordination, both by the invisible hand of prices in markets and by the quite visible hands of managers. Part III introduces the problems of contracting, information, and incentives, and gives an informal treatment of their solutiins. Part IV provides a careful, formal treatment of some of the central methods providing incentives efficiently. Part V presents an economic treatment of the nature of the employment relationship, examining explicit and implicit employment contracts, compensation policies, and career paths. Part VI treat financial decisions, particularly in investments, capital structure, and corporate control. The last part of the book comprises two chapters about the design, internal structure, and dynamics of organizations, including an examination of the boundaries and scope of business firms. |
Contents
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION AND EFFICIENCY | 19 |
MARKETS AND MANAGEMENT | 55 |
COORDINATING PLANS AND ACTION | 88 |
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activities actual adverse selection allocation amount assets assigned bargaining behavior benefits Bounded Rationality buyer Chapter Coase theorem compensation compensation principle competitive Contracts and Ownership coordination costly debt decision maker determine earnings effect efficiency wage Efficient Incentives efficient markets hypothesis effort employee's employees employment evaluation example executives expected factors firm firm's higher hold-up problem human capital Incentive Contracts income increase individual influence costs interests internal labor markets investment investors Japanese long-term managers marginal marginal cost maximize measure monitoring moral hazard Motivation Nash equilibrium offer optimal organization owners paid parties percent performance possible principle private information problem production profits promotion property rights quasi-rents relationship rent seeking rents reputation residual responsible returns risk aversion risk premium Risk Sharing sell shareholders specific suppliers Suppose takeover theory trade United variance wealth effects workers