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abso absolute mind absolute's absolutists abstract activity altho appear believe Bergson Bradley called conceived concepts concrete connexion consciousness contradictions definition dialectic distinct divine dualistic each-form empirical empiricists ence everything exist external fact Fechner feel finite experience flux give Hegel hegelian higher human hypothesis ideal idealists ideas identity inner intel intellectual intellectualist irrational irrationality knower lecture live logic lute means ment mental metaphysical method monistic monistic theism nature negation ness never Note notion objects once ourselves pantheistic perfect rationality philosophy pluralism pluralistic point of view practical principle problem of evil Professor psychology pure experience question radical empiricism rational rationalistic reality reason reductio ad absurdum relations religious rience Royce sciousness seems sensations sense separate sort soul supposed T. H. Green theism things thought tion transcendental idealism transcendentalist treat true truth tychism universe verbal vision whole words
Page 333 - Ring out the want, the care, the sin, The faithless coldness of the times: Ring out, ring out my mournful rhymes, But ring the fuller minstrel in.
Page 323 - Pragmatically interpreted, pluralism or the doctrine that it is many means only that the \ sundry parts of reality may be externally related. Everything you can think of, however vast or inclusive, has on the pluralistic view a genuinely 'external' environment of some sort or amount. Things are 'with' one another in many ways, but nothing includes everything, or dominates over everything.
Page 127 - He works in an external environment, has limits, and has enemies. When John Mill said that the notion of God's omnipotence must be given up, if God is to be kept as a religious object, he was surely accurately right; yet so prevalent is the lazy monism that idly haunts the region of God's...
Page 210 - psychology without a soul' to which my whole psychological and kantian education had committed me, — I must, in short, bring back distinct spiritual agents to know the mental states, now singly and now in combination, in a word bring back scholasticism and common sense...
Page 126 - God,' in the religious life of ordinary men, is the name not of the whole of things, heaven forbid, but only of the ideal tendency in things, believed in as a superhuman person who calls us to co-operate in his purposes, and who furthers ours if they are worthy. He works in an external environment, has limits, and has enemies.
Page 307 - There are resources in us that naturalism with its literal and legal virtues never recks of, possibilities that take our breath away, of another kind of happiness and power, based on giving up our own will and letting something higher work for us, and these seem to show a world wider than either physics or philistine ethics can imagine.
Page 291 - Every bit of us at every moment is part and parcel of a wider self, it quivers along various radii like the wind-rose on a compass, and the actual in it is continuously one with possibles not yet in our present sight.' And just as we are co-conscious with our own momentary margin, may not we ourselves form the margin of some more really central self in things which is co-conscious with the whole of us ? May not you and I be confluent in a higher consciousness, and confluently active there...
Page 314 - May not the godlessness usually but needlessly associated with the philosophy of immediate experience give way to a theism now seen to follow directly from that experience more widely taken? and may not rationalism, satisfied with seeing her a priori proofs of God so effectively replaced by empirical evidence, abate something of her absolutist claims? Let God but have the least infinitesimal other of any kind beside him, and empiricism and rationalism might strike hands in a lasting treaty of peace.
Page 125 - The ideally perfect whole is certainly that whole of which the parts also are perfect — if we can depend on logic for anything, we can depend on it for that definition. The absolute is defined as the ideally perfect whole, yet most of its parts, if not all, are admittedly imperfect.