Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism
Democratic governments are able to elicit, legally and legitimately, both money and men from their populations. Certainly there is tax evasion, draft evasion, and even outright resistance; yet to a remarkable extent citizens acquiesce and even actively consent to the demands of governments, well beyond the point explicable by coercion. This is a puzzle for social scientists, particularly those who believe that individuals are self-interested, rational actors who calculate only the private egoistic costs and benefits of possible choices. The provisions of collective good should never justify a quasi-voluntary tax payment and the benefits of a war could not possibly exceed the cost of dying. This book explains the institutionalization of policy in response to anticipated and actual citizen behaviour and the conditions under which citizens give, refuse and withdraw their consent. Professor Levi claims that citizens' consent is contingent upon the perceived fairness of both the government and of other citizens. Most citizens of democracies, most of the time, are more likely to give their consent if they believe that government actors and other citizens are behaving fairly toward them.
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Anglo-Saxon democracies anglophone army Australia Borden Britain British Canada century choice citizens will comply commitments compliance compulsory conscientious objection contingent conscientious contingent consent contribute costs countries debate defense democratic dissent draft dodging economic effect English Canadians enlistment ethical reciprocity exemptions explanation extent Figure France francophone French Canadians government actors government demand government policymakers groups ideological increased individuals institutional arrangements Irish Jehovah's Witnesses labor large numbers levée en masse Liberal major median legislator ment Military Service Act military service policy militia Minister mobilization model of contingent nationalist noncompliance norms objectors obligation Ontario opposition organizations Parliamentary Papers Vol party peace churches percent percentage policy bargain political population Quebec recruits refusal to consent relatively replacement resistance Schnapper 1968 scription Selective Service Selective Service System social soldiers substitution tion troops trustworthiness United universal conscription variation Vietnam voluntary volunteers vote World World War II Zealand
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