An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections

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R. &A. Foulis, 1769 - Emotions - 301 pages
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Page 4 - ... determination of our minds to receive ideas independently on our will, and to have perceptions of pleasure and pain ' (Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, sect.
Page 166 - ... kind actions of even criminals themselves surpass their crimes in numbers ; that it is the rarity of crimes, in comparison of innocent or good actions, which engages our attention to them, and makes them...
Page 165 - ... an estimate of the morals of mankind, or an hospital of the healthfulness of a climate. Ought they not to consider that the number of honest citizens and farmers far surpasses that of all sorts of criminals in any state; and that the innocent...
Page 6 - ... of Perceptions, since many are strongly affected with the Fortunes of others, who seldom reflect upon Virtue or Vice, in themselves, or others, as an Object : as we may find in Natural Affection, Compassion, Friendship, or even general Benevolence to Mankind, which connect our Happiness or Pleasure with that of others, even when we are not reflecting upon our own Temper, nor delighted with the Perception of our own Virtue. 5. The fifth Class is a Sense of...
Page 165 - Here men are apt to let their imaginations run out upon all the robberies, piracies, murders, perjuries, frauds, massacres, assassinations, they have ever either heard of, or read in history; thence concluding all mankind to be very wicked; as if a court of justice were the proper place for making an estimate of the morals of mankind, or an hospital of the healthfulness of a climate. Ought they not to consider...
Page 195 - We have two Principles of Action, Reason, and Affection or Passion : the former in common with Angels, the latter with Brutes : No Action is wise, or good, or reasonable, to which we are not excited by Reason, as distinct from all Affections ; or, if any such Actions as flow from Affections be good, it is only by chance, or materially and not formally.
Page 192 - ... whatever attribute can be ascribed to a generous kind action, the contrary attribute may as truly be ascribed to a selfish cruel action: both propositions are equally true, and the two contrary actions, the objects of the two truths, are equally conformable to their several truths, with that sort of conformity which is between a truth and its object. This conformity then cannot make a difference among actions, or recommend one more than another either to election or approbation, since any man...
Page 160 - ... system and engage him to serve it, whether he inclines to it or not. Thus we are formed with a view to a general good end, and may in our own nature discern a universal mind, watchful for the whole.
Page viii - nothing can stop the Operation of publick Affections but some Selfish Interest, the only way to give publick Affections their full Force, and to make them prevalent in our Lives, must be to remove these Opinions of opposite Interests, and to shew a superior Interest on their...
Page 212 - As to the first argument, it is plain we judge of our own affections, or those of others by our moral sense, by which we approve kind affections, and disapprove the contrary. But none can apply moral attributes to the very faculty of perceiving moral qualities; or call his moral sense morally good or evil, any more than he calls the power of tasting, sweet or bitter; or of seeing, straight or crooked, white or black.

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