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action agreement apprehend apprentice assigned assumpsit authority belong betwixt bind bond bound CHAP child choses choses in action committed common law compel Connecticut consent considered contract convey conveyance court of chancery court of equity court of law covenant coverture creditors damages death debts decision decree deed devise doctrine dower emblements entitled equity execution executor father fee simple fee tail femme covert fraud given ground guardian heir male holden husband and wife infant injury intention jointure judgment land lease legacy Levitical degrees liable Lord marriage married master maxim ment minor mortgage never opinion paid parent parol penalty performance personal estate personal property possession principle promise purchase real property reason recover render rent rescind respecting rule rule in Shelley's separate property servant settled socage statute suit supposed term tion tract trespass trust unless valid void voidable ward wife's words
Page 464 - And the reason is, because tenant " in tail holds of him in the reversion, and " he of the chief lord. If a man makes " a feoffment in fee to the use of himself " for life, remainder to his first son, &c. " in tail, remainder to himself and the heirs " male of his body, remainder to himself
Page 207 - The truth is that a contract which is obtained by fraud is, in point of law, no contract. The fraud blots out of existence whatever semblance of a contract there might have been. A marriage, procured without a contract, can never be deemed valid. There is no more reason for sanctioning a marriage procured by fraud, than one procured by force and violence. The consent is as totally wanting, in view of the law, in the former as in the latter case.
Page 117 - No estate in fee simple, fee tail, or any lesser estate, in lands or tenements, lying within this state, shall be given or granted, by deed or will, to any person or persons but such as are in being, or to the immediate issue or descendants...
Page 340 - The master had no control over the life of his slave. If he " killed him, he was liable to the same punishment as if he " killed a freeman. The master was as liable to be sued by the "slave, in an action for beating or wounding, or for immoderate "chastisement, as he would be, if he had thus treated an appren
Page 340 - ... immoderate chastisement, as he would be, if he had thus treated an apprentice. A slave was capable of holding property, in character of devisee, or legatee. If the master should lake away such property, his slave would be entitled to an action against him, by hisprochein ami.
Page 464 - Shelley's case of a limitation to the use of A. " for life, remainder to the use of his heirs and of their heirs female, was the " only one to the contrary, and in that case the word "heirs" must be a " description of the persons, in order to let in the limitation to the heirs
Page 288 - But when the punishment is, in their opinion, thus unreasonable, and it appears that the parent acted malo anirno, from wicked motives, under the influence of an unsocial heart, he ought to be liable to damages. For error of opinion he ought to be excused, but for malice of heart he must not be shielded from the just claims of the child.
Page 3 - ... the absolute dominion over her personal property in possession. Another ground of this liability at common law, sometimes given, is that the wife by her marriage is entirely deprived of the use and disposal of her property, and can acquire none by her industry; that her person, labor, and earnings belong unqualifiedly to the husband.
Page 341 - From the whole, we see that slaves had the same right of life and property as apprentices, and that the difference betwixt them was this, an apprentice is a servant for time and the slave is a servant for life.