Pluralism by the Rules: Conflict and Cooperation in Environmental Regulation

Edward P. Weber

Georgetown University Press, Jan 1, 1998 - Political Science - 328 pages

Despite America's pluralistic, fragmented, and generally adversarial political culture, participants in pollution control politics have begun to collaborate to reduce the high costs of developing, implementing, and enforcing regulations. Edward P. Weber uses examples from this traditionally combative policy arena to propose a new model for regulation, "pluralism by the rules," a structured collaborative format that can achieve more effective results at lower costs than typically come from antagonistic approaches.

Weber cites the complexity and high implementation costs of environmental policy as strong but insufficient incentives for collaboration. He shows that cooperation becomes possible when opposing sides agree to follow specific rules that include formal binding agreements about enforcement, commitment to the process by political and bureaucratic leaders, and the ensured access and accountability of all parties involved. Such rules establish trust, create assurances that agreements will be enforced, and reduce the perceived risks of collaboration. Through case studies dealing with acid rain, reformulated gasoline, and oil refinery pollution control, Weber demonstrates the potential of collaboration for realizing a cleaner environment, lower compliance costs, and more effective enforcement.

Challenging the prevailing view that endless conflict in policymaking is inevitable, Pluralism by the Rules establishes a theoretical framework for restructuring the regulatory process.

Contents

• Replacing the Old with the New: 1
• THE OLD GAME OF PLURALISM AND CONFLICT: 5
• THE NEW GAME OF COLLABORATION: 9
• TRANSACTION COSTS IN THE REGULATORY ARENA: 13
• WHY COLLABORATION?: 16
• CHAPTER NOTES: 24
• When Transaction Costs Can No Longer Be Ignored: 30
• THE POLITICALBUREAUCRATIC NEXUS: 32
• LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK AND UNCONVENTIONAL LAWMAKING: 38
• OPENING UP THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: 42
• INTERESTGROUP POWER EQUILIBRIUM: 46
• INTERNATIONAL MARKETS AND DEREGULATION: 50
• CHANGES IN THE STATEFEDERAL RELATIONSHIP: 53
• CONCLUSION: 57
• CHAPTER NOTES: 61
• The High Costs of Doing Business in Pollution Control Politics: 70
• TRANSACTION COST THEORY: 73
• INFORMATION SEARCH PROGRAM SPECIFICATION AND NEGOTIATION: 77
• PROGRAM ADAPTABILITY: 81
• MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT TRANSACTION COSTS: 86
• THE DISCONNECTEDNESS OF RULES FROM RESULTS: 94
• CONCLUSION: 97
• CHAPTER NOTES: 98
• Pluralism by the Rules The Transition to Collaborative Games: 105
• PUTTING THE COLLABORATIVE GAME INTO PLAY: 106
• TRANSACTIONSPECIFIC CONDITIONS: 108
• ENTREPRENEURIAL POLITICAL LEADERSHIP: 112
• ORGANIZATIONAL REPUTATION: 114
• FORMAL CONSTITUTIONAL RULES: 115
• INCLUSIVENESS: 116
• REPEAT GAMES: 117
• CHAPTER NOTES: 118
• Urban Smog and Dirty Gasoline Clearing the Air through Negotiation: 120
• BATTLING OVER REFORMULATED GASOLINE: 121
• CONSTRAINTS FOR THE REFORMULATED GASOLINE RFG RULEMAKING: 124
• THE REGNEG ALTERNATIVE: 126
• OVERCOMING UNCERTAINTY BY BUILDING TRUST: 127
• THE COLLABORATIVE GAME IN ACTION: 131
• STANDING FIRM FOR THE LONG TERM: 135
• REPUTATION CREDIBILITY AND THE LIMITS OF COLLABORATIVE GAMES: 140
• CHAPTER NOTES: 142
• Assuring Reductions in Acid Rain The Case of GovernmentImposed Markets: 148
• DEFINING GOVERNMENTIMPOSED MARKETS: 151
• MINIMIZING RESISTANCE AND DELAY: 153
• INCREASING THE CERTAINTY OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESULTS: 160
• THE SPECIAL CASE OF CONGRESS AS STAKEHOLDER: 164
• TAKING RISKS WITH PLURALISM BY THE RULES: 165
• MANAGEABILITY AND LEGITIMACY: 166
• MANAGING UNCERTAINTY THROUGH UNCONVENTIONAL LAWMAKING: 168
• FINALIZING THE DEAL WITH EXPLICIT LEGISLATIVE LANGUAGE: 170
• PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE OF REDUCED TRANSACTION COSTS: 171
• CHAPTER NOTES: 176
• Preventing Pollution through the Collaborative Search for Better Information: 184
• Lower Costs through Prevention and Integration: 186
• REDUCING POLLUTIONBASED INFORMATION DEFICITS: 187
• OVERCOMING INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES: 191
• MANAGEABILITY AND OPPORTUNITY: 192
• ENTREPRENEURS AND REPUTATION: 193
• EPA CREDIBILITY: 196
• WORKING TOGETHER TO DISCOVER WINWIN SOLUTIONS: 197
• MOVING TOWARD A CONSENSUS AGREEMENT: 198
• WAITING UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE: 204
• THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL: 206
• CHAPTER NOTES: 212
• Reinventing the Regulatory Game: 221
• The Promise of Collaborative Games: 222
• The Difficulty of Reinventing the Regulatory Game: 226
• RECONCEIVING THE ROLE OF BUREAUCRATIC LEADERS: 228
• HOLDING REINVENTED GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABLE: 232
• ACCESSING REINVENTED GOVERNMENT: 235
• REINVENTED GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC BACKLASH: 239
• CONTINUING PRESSURE TO PLAY COLLABORATIVE GAMES: 243
• CHAPTER NOTES: 249
• Coping with the Brave New World of Policy Administration: 256
• EXPLOITING THE NATURAL LIMITS OF COLLABORATIVE GAMES: 259
• CHAPTER NOTES: 264
• Bibliography: 267
• NameOrganization Index: 299
• Subject Index: 303

About the author

Edward P. Weber is an associate professor of political science at Washington State University, and is Director of the Thomas S. Foley Public Policy Institute.

Bibliographic information

• Title: Pluralism by the Rules: Conflict and Cooperation in Environmental Regulation; American Governance and Public Policy series
• Author: Edward P. Weber
• Publisher: Georgetown University Press, 1998
• ISBN: 1589013875, 9781589013872
• Length: 328 pages
• Subjects: Political Science / Public Policy / Environmental Policy; Political Science / Public Policy / General