Bank Privatization in Argentina: A Model of Political Constraints and Differential OutcomesWorld Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy and Finance, 2001 - Bancos - Argentina - 32 pages In describing outcomes, the literature on privatization has paid little attention to politicians' incentives, perhaps because it lacked the kinds of evidence needed to do so. Evidence from the privatization of provincial Argentine banks in the 1990s indicates that transaction contract features vary systematically with proxies for politicians' incentives. Will variation in transaction features have implications for post-privatization performance? |
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additional assets analysis assets and liabilities assets assumed attractive bank performance bank privatization contracts bank quality bank's Central Bank Clarke and Cull Class A shares comparative statics contract features contract provisions Convertibility Plan dummy Empirical Entre Rios Equilibrium fewer layoffs fiscal deficit framework future solvency g(xres Gov't indicates Keep at least less likelihood of privatization loan portfolio managers Megginson million payments percent pesos Policy Research political incentives poor performance post-privatization performance potential buyers pre-privatization assets predictions private owners privatization decisions privatization process privatized bank privatized entity protect fewer jobs province's fiscal provincial bank privatizations provincial banking sector provincial governments provincial policymakers provincial politicians proxy public banks public enterprises public ownership public provincial banks re-capitalize Research Working Paper restrictions on layoffs restructuring Río Negro risky assets service contract shares Maintain service state-owned enterprises suggests t-stat Tequila Crisis tradeoffs faced Tucumán variable variation workers World Bank Xres