Science Without LawsDebate over the nature of science has recently moved from the halls of academia into the public sphere, where it has taken shape as the "science wars." At issue is the question of whether scientific knowledge is objective and universal or socially mediated, whether scientific truths are independent of human values and beliefs. Ronald Giere is a philosopher of science who has been at the forefront of this debate from its inception, and Science without Laws offers a much-needed mediating perspective on an increasingly volatile line of inquiry. Giere does not question the major findings of modern science: for example, that the universe is expanding or that inheritance is carried by DNA molecules with a double helical structure. But like many critics of modern science, he rejects the widespread notion of science—deriving ultimately from the Enlightenment—as a uniquely rational activity leading to the discovery of universal truths underlying all natural phenomena. In these highly readable essays, Giere argues that it is better to understand scientists as merely constructing more or less abstract models of limited aspects of the world. Such an understanding makes possible a resolution of the issues at stake in the science wars. The critics of science are seen to be correct in rejecting the Enlightenment idea of science, and its defenders are seen to be correct in insisting that science does produce genuine knowledge of the natural world. Giere is utterly persuasive in arguing that to criticize the Enlightenment ideal is not to criticize science itself, and that to defend science one need not defend the Enlightenment ideal. Science without Laws thus stakes out a middle ground in these debates by showing us how science can be better conceived in other ways. |
Contents
ONE Viewing Science | 11 |
TWO Explaining Scientific Revolutions | 30 |
THREE Science and Technology Studies | 56 |
FOUR Naturalism and Realism | 69 |
FIVE Science without Laws of Nature | 84 |
SIX The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Theories | 97 |
SEVEN Visual Models and Scientific Judgment | 118 |
EIGHT Philosophy of Science Naturalized | 151 |
NINE Constructive Realism | 174 |
TEN The Feminism Question in the Philosophy | 200 |
ELEVEN From Wissenschaftliche Philosophie to Philosophy | 217 |
Perspectival Realism | 237 |
Common terms and phrases
analysis approach argued argument aspects Cambridge Carnap causal century chapter claims classical mechanics cognitive cognitive sciences concept constructive empiricism constructive realism constructivism constructivist context cultural distinction empirical ence Enlightenment entific epistemology evolutionary example experience explanation Feigl feminist Fraassen gender geomagnetic reversals Giere goals Hilary Putnam historical human inductive interpretation judgments justified Kuhn Kuhn's Lakatos Laudan laws of nature linguistic Logical Empiricism Logical Empiricist magnetic maps mathematical methodological model-based motion naturalistic Newton's norms North America objects particular pendulums perspectival perspective philosophy of science physics picture of science possible practice of science Pragmatism principles problem question rational real system Reichenbach rejection relationship relativism representation role science studies science wars scientific philosophers Scientific Revolutions scientific theories scientists similar social sociologists sociology of science strategy theory of science tion tradition truth underdetermination understanding University Press Vienna Circle visual