Models in Microeconomic Theory ('She' Edition)

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Open Book Publishers, Mar 27, 2020 - Business & Economics - 362 pages

Models in Microeconomic Theory covers basic models in current microeconomic theory. Part I (Chapters 1-7) presents models of an economic agent, discussing abstract models of preferences, choice, and decision making under uncertainty, before turning to models of the consumer, the producer, and monopoly. Part II (Chapters 8-14) introduces the concept of equilibrium, beginning, unconventionally, with the models of the jungle and an economy with indivisible goods, and continuing with models of an exchange economy, equilibrium with rational expectations, and an economy with asymmetric information. Part III (Chapters 15-16) provides an introduction to game theory, covering strategic and extensive games and the concepts of Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium. Part IV (Chapters 17-20) gives a taste of the topics of mechanism design, matching, the axiomatic analysis of economic systems, and social choice.

The book focuses on the concepts of model and equilibrium. It states models and results precisely, and provides proofs for all results. It uses only elementary mathematics (with almost no calculus), although many of the proofs involve sustained logical arguments. It includes about 150 exercises.

With its formal but accessible style, this textbook is designed for undergraduate students of microeconomics at intermediate and advanced levels.


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About the author (2020)

Ariel Rubinstein was born in Jerusalem in 1951 and lives in Tel Aviv. He received his PhD from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem in 1979. Has been a Professor at the Hebrew University and at Princeton. Currently he is a (Emeritus) Professor at Tel Aviv University and a Professor at New York University. He has served as the President of the Econometric Society (2004). He is a foreign honorary member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the American Economic Association, a Fellow of the Israeli Academy of Sciences and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy. He won the Israel Prize (2002), the Nemmers Prize (2004), the EMET prize (2006) and the Rothschild Prize (2010). He has written 105 articles and 6 books: Bargaining and Markets (with M. Osborne) (1990), A Course in Game Theory (with M. Osborne) (1994), Modeling Bounded Rationality (1998), Economics and Language (2000), Lecture Notes in Microeconomics (2005) and Economic Fables (2012). His main fields of research are Economic Theory, Decision Theory, Models of Bounded Rationality and Game Theory.

Martin J. Osborne received a PhD from Stanford University in 1979 and is currently a Professor of Economics at the University of Toronto. He was a member of the group that founded the Open Access journal Theoretical Economics, and served at the editor of that journal from 2005 to 2013. He is the author of An Introduction to Game Theory (2003) and a coauthor, with Ariel Rubinstein, of Bargaining and Markets (1990) and A Course in Game Theory (1994).

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