## Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey |

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### Contents

CHAPTER | 1 |

Utility Theory | 12 |

Extensive and Normal Forms | 39 |

Copyright | |

47 other sections not shown

### Other editions - View all

Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey R. Duncan Luce,Howard Raiffa Limited preview - 2012 |

Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey Robert Duncan Luce,Howard Raiffa Limited preview - 1957 |

### Common terms and phrases

alternatives analysis arbitrated solution arbitration scheme argument assumed assumption axioms Chapter characteristic function choose coalition structure collusion concept condition conflict of interest consider constant-sum cooperative game decision denote discussion dominates economic equilibrium pairs equilibrium point equilibrium strategy equivalent example exists expected value extensive form finite number gamble game in extensive game theory game tree given imputations indifferent individual information sets interpersonal comparisons interpretation least linear utility function lottery mathematical maximin strategy maximize minimax mixed strategy move n-person game n-tuple Nash Nash's negotiation set Neumann and Morgenstern non-cooperative game normal form notion outcome Pareto optimal payoff matrix play player l's possible preplay communication prisoner's dilemma probability distribution pure strategy rational reasonable restricted rules security level sense Shapley Shapley value side payments situation social stable strategy choice strictly competitive games subset theorem theory of games tion tive two-person games unique utility theory yield zero-sum game