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abstract abstract law activity actual agent altruism appeal to motives basis benevolence Bentham capacity character common conceived conception concrete conscience consciousness consequences crete criterion Critical Philosophy Deontology duty egoism element emotions end of action end of conduct end of desire environment ethical world eudaimonia exercise of function existing external fact feeling freedom genuine opposition give happiness hedonism hedonistic human idea ideal immoral impulse individual interest intrinsic judgment Julius Caesar Kant Kant's Kantian Leslie Stephen means ment Mill moral action moral conduct moral end moral law moral value motive nature object of desire obligation one's particular person pleas principle question realized recognize reference regard relation result rule sake satis satisfaction satisfied sense simply social society specific Spencer standard Stanton Coit sum of pleasures synthetic pleasures term theory thing tion true unity universal Utilitarianism vidual wants whole wholly
Page 53 - I must again repeat what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent's own happiness but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.
Page 68 - I conceive it to be the business of moral science to deduce from the laws of life and the conditions of existence what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness and what kinds to produce unhappiness. Having done this, its deductions are to be recognised as laws of conduct; and are to be conformed to, irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery' Perhaps an analogy will most clearly show my meaning.
Page 48 - Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure.
Page 17 - I believe that these sources of evidence, impartially consulted, will declare that desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable or rather two parts of the same phenomenon; in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same psychological fact...
Page 69 - I believe that the experiences of utility organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have been producing corresponding nervous modifications, which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition — certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility.
Page 55 - No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good : that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the...
Page 59 - To do as you would be done by," and "to love your neighbor as yourself," constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.
Page 48 - ... no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs.
Page 15 - Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do.