Algorithmic Game Theory
Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos, Vijay V. Vazirani
Cambridge University Press, Sep 24, 2007 - Computers
In recent years game theory has had a substantial impact on computer science, especially on Internet- and e-commerce-related issues. Algorithmic Game Theory, first published in 2007, develops the central ideas and results of this exciting area in a clear and succinct manner. More than 40 of the top researchers in this field have written chapters that go from the foundations to the state of the art. Basic chapters on algorithmic methods for equilibria, mechanism design and combinatorial auctions are followed by chapters on important game theory applications such as incentives and pricing, cost sharing, information markets and cryptography and security. This definitive work will set the tone of research for the next few years and beyond. Students, researchers, and practitioners alike need to learn more about these fascinating theoretical developments and their widespread practical application.
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agents algorithm allocation approximation assignment assume behavior best response bidder bound bundle buyer Chapter choose combinatorial auctions computational consider constraints converge convex correlated equilibrium cost functions cost shares cost-sharing defined Definition denote distribution dominant strategy dynamic edge efficient equilibrium flow example exists expected ﬂow game theory given graph graphical game implementation implies incentive compatible inequality input Lemma linear linear program machine Markov network maximize mechanism design mixed strategy monotone Nash equilibrium nodes nonatomic online algorithm outcome parties path payment payoff player polynomial potential function prediction markets preferences price of anarchy price of stability problem Proc profit proof protocol pure strategy random ratio reputation systems routing games Section selfish routing Shapley social choice solution concept strategy-proof symmetric game Symp Theorem traders truthful users utility functions valuations vector vertex Vickrey auction
Page xxi - Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, and Coordinated Science Laboratory, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign...