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actions amongst answer assent bishop of Worcester body capable cause cerning certainly CHAP clear and distinct colours complex ideas conceive concerning confused consciousness consider consists desire determined discourse distinct ideas distinguish doubt duration evident examine existence extension faculties false farther happiness hath idea of infinite idea of substance imagine imprinted infi infinity innate ideas innate principles judge Julian period knowledge liberty lordship maxims measure men's mind mixed modes moral motion names nature ness never objects observe operations opinion pain particles of matter particular perceive perception perhaps personal identity pleasure positive idea produce propositions prove reason receive relation resurrection rule sensation and reflection senses sensible qualities sidered signify simple ideas Socrates soever solid sort soul speak spirit stances stand substratum suppose taken notice things thoughts tion true truth understanding uneasiness virtue whereby wherein whereof whilst
Page 136 - For. wit lying most in the assemblage of ideas. and putting those together with quickness and variety wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity. thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy: judgment. on the contrary. lies quite on the other side. in separating carefully one from another ideas wherein can be found the least difference. thereby to avoid being misled by similitude and by affinity to take one thing for another.
Page 372 - Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report ; if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, think on these things.
Page 351 - Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die. And that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall be, but bare grain ; it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain. But God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him ; and to every seed his own body.
Page 77 - Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself.
Page 78 - First, Our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them: and thus we come by those ideas we have, of Yellow, White, Heat, Cold, Soft, Hard, Bitter, Sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities; which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions.
Page 331 - I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places...
Page 435 - Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas; and ideas become general by separating from them the circumstances of time, and place, and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence.
Page 130 - Thus the ideas, as well as children, of our youth often die before us ; and our minds represent to us those tombs to which we are approaching ; where though the brass and marble remain, yet the inscriptions are effaced by time, and the imagery moulders away. The pictures drawn in our minds are laid in fading colours ; and if not sometimes refreshed, vanish and disappear.
Page 338 - Self is that conscious thinking thing, whatever substance made up of (whether spiritual or material, simple or compounded, it matters not), which is sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness extends.
Page 112 - Secondly, such qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, ie by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts, as colours, sounds, tastes, &c.