Democracy, Bureaucracy, and Public Choice: Economic Explanations in Political Science |
Contents
INTEREST GROUPS | 13 |
RECONSTRUCTING THE THEORY | 45 |
VOTING BEHAVIOUR | 79 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
activities actor model actors advocacy costs agency types agency's alternative analysis assumptions behaviour budget increments budget-maximizing models bureau budget bureau-shaping model bureaucrats central changes collective action collective benefits Conservative constraints contracts core budget corporatism corporatist decisions deinstitutionalization delivery agencies democratic Dunleavy economic effects election electoral empirical endogenous groups example existing public choice exogenous external Figure firms free-riding group identity group leaders group members group-joining growth Hence identity set increases indifference curves individual influence interest groups internal issue labour leadership liberal democracies major marginal mass media maximize median membership Niskanen non-excludable non-joiners Olson organization organizational outputs participation party competition party leaders perfect information pluralist Political Science position potential members preference-accommodating preference-shaping strategies problems program budget public choice accounts public choice models public choice theory rational role senior officials shift social sponsor staff super-program budget trade unions voters voting welfare