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MEDIAN VOTER PREFERENCES CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
The optimal degree of conservatism and independence
A. F. POZZOLO adjust policy targets appears from equation attitudes towards inﬂation average inﬂation target aversion of monetary aversion of policy aversion to inﬂation Bundesbank’s central bank independence central bank inﬂation central bank policy conservatism and independence correlation Cukierman deﬁne degree of central degree of conservatism degree of independence degree of inﬂation delegation arrangement desired and natural discretionary policy effective degree empirical Ex-post losses expected inﬂation expected value ﬁrst order condition ﬂexibility to adjust full independence gap between desired govemment Hayo high degree implies independence and conservatism inﬂation and output inﬂationary bias problem instability Italy level of inﬂation Lippi loss function losses under discretion low inﬂation median voter preferences monetary policy delegation natural output optimal degree output target output weight paper policy is implemented random variable reaction function reﬂected regime parameters retains more ﬂexibility supply shock Temi di discussione temptation to inﬂate ttfn values of inﬂation Waller and Walsh