Snort Intrusion Detection and Prevention ToolkitThis all new book covering the brand new Snort version 2.6 from members of the Snort developers team. This fully integrated book and Web toolkit covers everything from packet inspection to optimizing Snort for speed to using the most advanced features of Snort to defend even the largest and most congested enterprise networks. Leading Snort experts Brian Caswell, Andrew Baker, and Jay Beale analyze traffic from real attacks to demonstrate the best practices for implementing the most powerful Snort features. The book will begin with a discussion of packet inspection and the progression from intrusion detection to intrusion prevention. The authors provide examples of packet inspection methods including: protocol standards compliance, protocol anomaly detection, application control, and signature matching. In addition, application-level vulnerabilities including Binary Code in HTTP headers, HTTP/HTTPS Tunneling, URL Directory Traversal, Cross-Site Scripting, and SQL Injection will also be analyzed. Next, a brief chapter on installing and configuring Snort will highlight various methods for fine tuning your installation to optimize Snort performance including hardware/OS selection, finding and eliminating bottlenecks, and benchmarking and testing your deployment. A special chapter also details how to use Barnyard to improve the overall performance of Snort. Next, best practices will be presented allowing readers to enhance the performance of Snort for even the largest and most complex networks. The next chapter reveals the inner workings of Snort by analyzing the source code. The next several chapters will detail how to write, modify, and fine-tune basic to advanced rules and pre-processors. Detailed analysis of real packet captures will be provided both in the book and the companion material. Several examples for optimizing output plugins will then be discussed including a comparison of MySQL and PostrgreSQL. Best practices for monitoring Snort sensors and analyzing intrusion data follow with examples of real world attacks using: ACID, BASE, SGUIL, SnortSnarf, Snort_stat.pl, Swatch, and more. The last part of the book contains several chapters on active response, intrusion prevention, and using Snort’s most advanced capabilities for everything from forensics and incident handling to building and analyzing honey pots.
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From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 76
Page xi
... Signatures and much more. Matt spent 5 years serving abroad in the Army before attending Indiana State University and the Rose-Hulman Institute.After several years as a general consultant he became Lead Technician for Sprint's Internal ...
... Signatures and much more. Matt spent 5 years serving abroad in the Army before attending Indiana State University and the Rose-Hulman Institute.After several years as a general consultant he became Lead Technician for Sprint's Internal ...
Page xiv
... Signatures and Analysis, Inside Network Perimeter Security, Second Edition, IT Ethics Handbook, SANS Security Essentials, SANS Security Leadership Essentials and Network Intrusion Detection, Third Edition. He was the original author of ...
... Signatures and Analysis, Inside Network Perimeter Security, Second Edition, IT Ethics Handbook, SANS Security Essentials, SANS Security Leadership Essentials and Network Intrusion Detection, Third Edition. He was the original author of ...
Page 3
... signatures and can compare patterns of activity, traffic, or behavior it sees in the data it's monitoring against those signatures to recognize when a close match between a signature and current or recent behavior occurs.At that point ...
... signatures and can compare patterns of activity, traffic, or behavior it sees in the data it's monitoring against those signatures to recognize when a close match between a signature and current or recent behavior occurs.At that point ...
Page 4
... signatures. Indeed, signature detection is the most widely used approach in commercial IDS technology today. Another approach is called anomaly detection. It uses rules or predefined concepts about “normal” and “abnormal” system ...
... signatures. Indeed, signature detection is the most widely used approach in commercial IDS technology today. Another approach is called anomaly detection. It uses rules or predefined concepts about “normal” and “abnormal” system ...
Page 7
... signatures can be downloaded to the sensors on an as-needed basis.The rules for each sensor can be tailored to meet its individual needs.Alerts can be forwarded to a messaging system located on the management station and used to notify ...
... signatures can be downloaded to the sensors on an as-needed basis.The rules for each sensor can be tailored to meet its individual needs.Alerts can be forwarded to a messaging system located on the management station and used to notify ...
Contents
| 1 | |
| 31 | |
| 69 | |
| 133 | |
Chapter 5 Inner Workings | 175 |
Chapter 6 Preprocessors | 225 |
Chapter 7 Playing by the Rules | 295 |
Chapter 8 Snort Output PlugIns | 343 |
Chapter 9 Exploring IDS Event Analysis Snort Style | 411 |
Chapter 10 Optimizing Snort | 499 |
Chapter 11 Active Response | 557 |
Chapter 12 Advanced Snort | 621 |
Chapter 13 Mucking Around with Barnyard | 645 |
Index | 717 |
Common terms and phrases
addition alert records allows analysis application attack Barnyard binary bytes capability chapter client Code Listing command line config configuration file create database decode default defined destination detection engine dynamic example exploit EXTERNAL_NET false positives Figure firewall format fragment function Fwsnort hardware header HOME_NET host ICMP IDSes implementation inline install interface intrusion detection IP address IPTABLES kernel libpcap Linux log files look match mode module monitoring multiple MySQL Netfilter OINK OpenBSD operating system output plug-in packet packet sniffer password pcap PCRE performance port PostgreSQL preprocessor protocol rule options ruleset script server SGUIL signature SMTP Snort alert Snort rules Snort sensor snort_inline snort.conf SnortSam specified stream string syslog tcpdump Telnet tion triggered unified files update vulnerability Web server Windows write