Applied Ethics in Animal Research: Philosophy, Regulation, and Laboratory Applications
This volume is a collection of chapters all contributed by individuals who have presented their ideas at conferences and who take moderate stands with the use of animals in research. Specifically the chapters bear of the issues of: notions of the moral standings of animals, history of the methods of argumentation, knowledge of the animal mind, nature and value of regulatory structures, how respect for animals can be converted from theory to action in the laboratory. The chapters have been tempered by open discussion with individuals with different opinions and not audiences of true believers. It is the hope of all, that careful consideration of the positions in these chapters will leave reader with a deepened understanding--not necessarily a hardened position.
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ability activists ACUCs adverse effects analgesics animal cognition animal consciousness Animal Ethics animal experimentation Animal Experiments animal pain animal research animal rights animal suffering Animal Welfare Act animals in research anti-Semitism Ape Project apes argued argument behavior being's Bekoff Biller-Andorno bioethics biomedical birds Cambridge characteristics claim clinical signs cognitive ethology committees concept concern consideration debate Descartes Descartes's dogs dose edited empathy empathy-oriented ethologists example feel pain Finsen Frey harm human lives husbandry important individuals issues Jasper and Nelkin Jews justify laboratory animals laws mals Marc Bekoff medicine mice moral agent moral community moral status Morton notion number of animals pain and suffering perspective Peter Singer philosophical possible primates protocols question Regan relevant rhetoric Rollin scientific procedure scientists score sheets sense Singer social play species speciesism speciesist Sperling standards study of animal testing tion treatment University Press veterinary vivisection York
Page 24 - If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for disregarding that suffering, or for refusing to count it equally with the like suffering of any other being. But the converse of this is also true. If a being is not capable of suffering, or of enjoyment, there is nothing to take into account