The Philosophy of PsychologyWhat is the relationship between common-sense, or 'folk', psychology and contemporary scientific psychology? Are they in conflict with one another? Or do they perform quite different, though perhaps complementary, roles? George Botterill and Peter Carruthers discuss these questions, defending a robust form of realism about the commitments of folk psychology and about the prospects for integrating those commitments into natural science. Their focus throughout the book is on the ways in which cognitive science presents a challenge to our common-sense self-image - arguing that our native conception of the mind will be enriched, but not overturned, by science. The Philosophy of Psychology is designed as a textbook for upper-level undergraduate and beginning graduate students in philosophy and cognitive science, but as a text that not only surveys but advances the debates on the topics discussed, it will also be of interest to researchers working in these areas. |
Contents
Introduction some background | 1 |
2 Developments in psychology | 12 |
3 Conclusion | 23 |
Folkpsychological commitments | 24 |
2 Two varieties of antirealism | 26 |
3 The case for realism about folk psychology | 31 |
4 Realism and eliminativism | 40 |
5 Using folk psychology | 46 |
5 Practical rationality | 125 |
6 Conclusion | 130 |
Content for psychology | 131 |
2 Arguments for wide content | 133 |
3 The coherence of narrow content | 138 |
4 Explanation and causation | 143 |
5 Folkpsychological content | 155 |
6 Conclusion | 160 |
6 Conclusion | 48 |
Modularity and nativism | 49 |
1 Some background on empiricism and nativism | 50 |
2 The case for nativism | 52 |
3 Developmental rigidity and modularity | 56 |
4 Fodorian modularity | 62 |
5 Input systems versus central systems | 66 |
6 Conclusion | 75 |
Mindreading | 77 |
2 Problems for simulationism | 83 |
3 A hybrid view | 89 |
4 Developmental studies | 91 |
5 Accounting for autistic impairments | 99 |
6 Conclusion | 103 |
Reasoning and irrationality | 105 |
2 Some psychological evidence | 108 |
3 Philosophical arguments in defence of rationality | 111 |
4 Psychological explanations of performance | 119 |
Content naturalised | 161 |
2 Informational semantics | 163 |
3 Teleosemantics | 167 |
4 Functionalrole semantics | 176 |
5 Naturalisation versus reduction | 184 |
6 Conclusion | 190 |
Forms of representation | 191 |
2 Mentalese versus connectionism | 194 |
3 The place of natural language in thought | 208 |
4 Conclusion | 225 |
Consciousness the final frontier? | 227 |
2 Mysterianism | 234 |
3 Cognitivist theories | 247 |
4 Conclusion | 271 |
References | 272 |
290 | |
295 | |
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Common terms and phrases
argued argument autistic behaviour beliefs and desires brain capacity Carruthers causal causal role cause central cognition chapter characterised claim cognitive science committed computational concepts conceptualised connectionism connectionist conscious counterfactual Dennett developmental distinct domains eliminativism entertain example experience explain fact false belief first-order Fodor folk psychology folk-psychological function functional-role semantics higher-order thought holism human individuated inference inferential inner speech input intentional intentional stance involved kinds knowledge mental Mentalese mind-reading abilities modular modules MOUSE narrow content narrow-content natural language naturalisation neural non-conscious normal notion of content objects output particular perception phenomenal consciousness philosophy of mind physical possible predict principles problem properties propositional attitudes qualia question rationality realism reasoning recognitional relevant representations scientific psychology seems selection task sentences simulation simulationism simulationist singular thought someone sort structure subjects suppose Swampman theory of mind theory-theory thing token truth-conditions visual wide content