Philosophical Papers: Volume 2, Mind, Language and Reality

Front Cover
Cambridge University Press, Apr 30, 1979 - Philosophy - 457 pages
2 Reviews
Introduction
1 Language and philosophy
2 The analytic and synthetic
3 Do true assertions correspond to reality?
4 Some issues in the theory of grammar
5 The ‘innateness hypothesis’ and explanatory models in linguistics
6 How not to talk about meaning
7 Review of The concept of a person
8 Is semantics possible?
9 The refutation of conventionalism
10 Reply to Gerald Massey
11 Explanation and reference
12 The meaning of ‘meaning’
13 Language and reality
14 Philosophy and our mental life
15 Dreaming and ‘depth grammar’
16 Brains and behaviour
17 Other minds
18 Minds and machines
19 Robots: machines or artificially created life?
20 The mental life of some machines
21 The nature of mental states
22 Logical positivism and the philosophy of mind
Bibliography
Index
 

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Contents

Language and philosophy
1
The analytic and the synthetic
33
Do true assertions correspond to reality?
70
Some issues in the theory of grammar
85
The innateness hypothesis and explanatory models in linguistics
107
How not to talk about meaning
117
Review of The concept of a person
132
Is semantics possible?
139
Philosophy and our mental life
291
Dreaming and depth grammar
304
Brains and behavior
325
Other minds
342
Minds and machines
362
Robots machines or artificially created life?
386
The mental life of some machines
408
The nature of mental states
429

The refutation of conventionalism
153
Reply to Gerald Massey
192
Explanation and reference
196
The meaning of meaning
215
Language and reality
272
Logical positivism and the philosophy of mind
441
Bibliography
452
Index
456
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The Parameter of Aspect
C.S. Smith
Limited preview - 1997
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About the author (1979)

According to John Passmore, Hilary Putnam's work is a "history of recent philosophy in outline" (Recent Philosophers). He adds that writing "about "Putnam's philosophy' is like trying to capture the wind with a fishing-net." Born in Chicago and educated at the University of Pennsylvania and the University of California at Los Angeles, Putnam taught at Northwestern University, Princeton University, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology before moving to Harvard University in 1965. In his early years at Harvard, he was an outspoken opponent of the war in Vietnam. Although he writes in the idiom of analytic philosophy, Putnam addresses major themes relating science to ethics and epistemology. If these themes are reminiscent of David Hume---as, for that matter, is much of analytic philosophy---his treatment of them is not. Putnam's work is far more profoundly shaped by recent work in logic, foundations of mathematics, and science than would have been possible for Hume; Putnam has contributed to each. He differs from Hume and stands more in the tradition of Willard Quine and American pragmatism in his treatment of the crucial distinctions between analytic and synthetic statements and between facts and values. Both distinctions, sharply made by Hume, are claimed by Putnam not to be absolute. He attempts to show, for example, that basic concepts of philosophy, science, and mathematics all are interrelated, so that mathematics bears more similarity to empirical reasoning than is customarily acknowledged.

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