The World and Yugoslavia's Wars
Richard Henry Ullman, Council on Foreign Relations
Council on Foreign Relations, 1996 - Political Science - 230 pages
All of the wars that have wracked the former Yugoslavia since 1991 involved outside powers. Those outsiders--notably, the United States, the leading members of the European Union, and Russia--did not prevent the forces of ethnic nationalism from destroying a once relatively stable and productive country. Not until late 1995 did outside powers induce representatives of the three warring parties to sign an agreement finally ending the savage war over the future of the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The nature, scope, and meaning of the actions and inactions of outsiders is the subject of this book. Why did the victors in the Cold War and the 1991 Gulf War not act to stop the slaughter? Will the fissures in the Western alliance induced by the war in Bosnia corrode still further the relationships among the alliance's principal members? Will they widen the gap between Russia and the West? What can outside powers do now to help heal the terrible wounds caused by Yugoslavia's wars? What are the prospects for the agreement the three sides initialed at Dayton, Ohio? These are among the questions addressed by the nine specialists on international relations who have contributed to this book. Besides the editor, the contributors include Thomas Weiss of Brown University, Stanley Hoffmann of Harvard, David C. Gompert of the RAND Corporation, Paul A. Goble of the Potomac Foundation, Richard Sobel of Princeton, Jean E. Manas of JP Morgan, Inc., and Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes, both of Harvard. " ŬHoffmann's chapter ̈ is the best analysis that I have seen of the European performance." Anthony Lewis in The New Republic
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aggression air strikes allies American approval arms embargo August Balkans Bihac bombing borders Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosnia-Herzegovina Bosnian Muslims Bosnian Serbs Bosnian war British Bush administration cease-fire civilians Clinton command conflict Croatia Croats Dayton agreement economic efforts enforcement ethnic cleansing Europe Favor federal foreign policy former Yugoslavia France French German Greater Serbia Herzegovina human rights humanitarian institutions international community involved issue Kosovo Krajina leaders leadership Macedonia military action military force Milosevic minority mission Moscow multilateral NATO NATO's negotiations Oppose organizations parties peace peacekeeping peacekeeping force percent PIPA political polls post-Cold President problem protect recognition refugees regional republics response role Russian safe areas sanctions Sarajevo secession secretary-general self-determination Serbian settlement Slovenes Slovenia Slovenia and Croatia Soviet Union territory threat tion tional U.N. forces U.N. operations U.N. peacekeepers U.N. troops UNHCR United Nations UNPROFOR Washington West Western York Yugoslav crisis Yugoslavia's wars
Page 212 - Decides that all States shall cooperate fully with the International Tribunal and its organs in accordance with the present resolution and the Statute of the International Tribunal and that consequently all States shall take any measures necessary under their domestic law to implement the provisions...
Page 24 - Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe.
Page 64 - There is a fantastic gap between the resolutions of the Security Council, the will to execute those resolutions, and the means available to commanders in the field.
Page 96 - Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," Foreign Policy, no. 89 (Winter 1992-93), p.
Page 203 - The assumptions and related instructions would be along the following lines : (a) That in establishing the Force and defining its important function, the Security Council realized that the Force could not discharge that function unless it had complete freedom of movement in Cyprus, which could only mean such unrestricted freedom of movement as may be considered essential by the Force Commander to the implementation of the mandates of the Force.
Page 75 - These tensions surfaced again in September 1993 in the minority report of the US Commission on Improving the Effectiveness of the United Nations...
Page 63 - Nations and has lent a new and disgraceful connotation to the word "peacekeeping." Bound by the traditional rules of engagement (fire only in self-defense, and only after being fired upon), UN troops never fought a single battle with any of the factions in Bosnia that routinely disrupted relief convoys. The rules of engagement led to the appeasement of local forces rather than to the enforcement of UN mandates. Among the most unsafe locations in the Balkans, indeed in the world, were the so-called...
Page 203 - Examples in which troops may be so authorized are: (a) attempts by force to compel them to withdraw from a position which they occupy under orders from their commanders, or to infiltrate and envelop such positions as are deemed necessary by their commanders for them to hold, thus jeopardizing their safety; (b) attempts by force to disarm them; (c) attempts by force to prevent them from carrying out their responsibilities as ordered by their commanders; (d) violation by force of United Nations premises...
Page 178 - Table 8.9 British Attitudes about Intervention in Bosnia Bl.l Do you approve or disapprove of the use of British troops in Bosnia to protect humanitarian aid convoys? 4/93 6/93 9/93 2/94 6/1/94 6/8/94 10/12/95 B1.2 If the British troops protecting the aid convoys suffered serious casualties, should we pull them out, continue to limit them to fighting back only when they are attacked or take steps to reinforce them? 4/93 6/93 9/93 2/94 6/1/94 6/8/94 10/12/95 B1.3 If an international force...