A Shield in Space?: Technology, Politics, and the Strategic Defense Initiative : how the Reagan Administration Set Out to Make Nuclear Weapons "impotent and Obsolete" and Succumbed to the Fallacy of the Last Move

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University of California Press, Jan 1, 1989 - Political Science - 409 pages
In March 1983, Ronald Reagan made one of the most controversial announcements of his presidency when he called on the nation's scientists and engineers to develop a defensive shield so impenetrable as to make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete."
This book provides the first comprehensive review and evaluation of the project launched to implement that announcement --the project officially known as the Strategic Defense Initiative and more popularly as "Star Wars." The authors--a political scientist and a physicist who has played a key role in developing military technologies--provide an intriguing account of how political rather than technical judgment led to the initial decision, and they explain the technical issues in terms accessible to nonspecialists.
Judging SDI as "a classic example of misplaced faith in the promise of technological salvation," the authors examine the implications of the program for strategy, arms control, the unity of the Western alliance, its prospective economic impact, and the way the American political process has dealt with all these issues. In March 1983, Ronald Reagan made one of the most controversial announcements of his presidency when he called on the nation's scientists and engineers to develop a defensive shield so impenetrable as to make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete."
This book provides the first comprehensive review and evaluation of the project launched to implement that announcement --the project officially known as the Strategic Defense Initiative and more popularly as "Star Wars." The authors--a political scientist and a physicist who has played a key role in developing military technologies--provide an intriguing account of how political rather than technical judgment led to the initial decision, and they explain the technical issues in terms accessible to nonspecialists.
Judging SDI as "a classic example of misplaced faith in the promise of technological salvation," the authors examine the implications of the program for strategy, arms control, the unity of the Western alliance, its prospective economic impact, and the way the American political process has dealt with all these issues.
 

Contents

Why SDI?
1
Lessons of Recent History
48
A Defense Transition?
132
A Maginot Line of the Twentyfirst Century?
217
SDI and Domestic Politics
252
Calculating the Costs and Benefits
291
Notes
357
Select Bibliography
387
Index
399
Copyright

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About the author (1989)

Sanford Lakoff is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, and co-editor of Strategic Defense and the Western Alliance (1987); Herbert F. York is Director of the Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation at UCSD and author of Making Weapons, Talking Peace: A Physicist's Odyssey from Hiroshima to Geneva (1987).

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