Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion
The idea of a disjunctive theory of visual experiences first found expression in J.M. Hinton's pioneering 1973 book Experiences. In the first monograph in this exciting area since then, William Fish develops a comprehensive disjunctive theory, incorporating detailed accounts of the three core kinds of visual experience--perception, hallucination, and illusion--and an explanation of how perception and hallucination could be indiscriminable from one another without having anything in common. In the veridical case, Fish contends that the perception of a particular state of affairs involves the subject's being acquainted with that state of affairs, and that it is the subject's standing in this acquaintance relation that makes the experience possess a phenomenal character. Fish argues that when we hallucinate, we are having an experience that, while lacking phenomenal character, is mistakenly supposed by the subject to possess it. Fish then shows how this approach to visual experience is compatible with empirical research into the workings of the brain and concludes by extending this treatment to cover the many different types of illusion that we can be subject to.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Other editions - View all
acquainting the subject appeal argues argument from hallucination argument from illusion aware blind brain stimulation C. D. Broad cathode ray tube change blindness chapter claim cognitive effects cognitive illusion color color illusion concept conceptual-recognitional capacities conscious experience definition of hallucination disjunctive disjunctivism disjunctivist doxastic setting ence environment example experiential explain felt reality fine-grained given hallucinating subject hallucinatory higher order beliefs indiscriminable instantiated intuition lack phenomenal character local supervenience look lucination Martin McDowell mental event mind-independent Müller-Lyer illusion naive realism neural activity neural replication nonveridical objects one’s optical illusions orange particular Penfield perceive phenom phenomenal property philosophical phosphenes physical illusions possible presentational character problem property of acquainting qualify reason relation relevant representationalist resisted hallucinations rience rope seen sense shade shape the contours snake spreading step subject is acquainted subject’s suggests Susanna Siegel theory thereby things tion veridical experience veridical perception visual experience