An Economic Analysis of Marriage and Divorce |
Contents
OPTIMAL SHARES AT DIVORCE | 54 |
THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT AND EFFICIENT RULES | 63 |
A FAMILY WITH ONE DOMINATING SPOUSE | 78 |
Copyright | |
3 other sections not shown
Common terms and phrases
absence of dominance age difference alimony allocation altruism analysis assume Becker breach career opportunities chapter choice variables comparative advantages concerning contribution custody cycle utilities denoted divorce rule economic Ellman envelope theorem equality examine expected life cycle f"aß family-specific public gains to marriage hazard function hence hours a week household income increase individuals induce investments in marriage-specific joint property jointly efficient level Konrad and Lommerud labor supply male sample marginal utility marital decision-making marriage contract marriage-specific capital married maximize Nash bargaining Nash bargaining game non-cooperative objective function obtained order conditions P-value parameters parents Pareto improving possible preferences presence of dominance probability of divorce Probit model Proof of proposition public provision result risk aversion risk of divorce second period solution spousal support strictly concave threat points transfer utility functions wage rate welfare wife wife's women