Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 4
Page 14
... correspondence . One possible shape of this correspondence is illustrated 5 in Figure 2 . 82 ^ 2 < X A T X2 = A + v ( xq ) − 2Xq X1 Firm 1's Equilibrium Reaction Schedule Figure 2 The equilibrium reaction correspondence should not be ...
... correspondence . One possible shape of this correspondence is illustrated 5 in Figure 2 . 82 ^ 2 < X A T X2 = A + v ( xq ) − 2Xq X1 Firm 1's Equilibrium Reaction Schedule Figure 2 The equilibrium reaction correspondence should not be ...
Page 15
... correspondence is drawn to include the > A. axis for x2 X2 is not derived from equation ( 16 ) , which only applies when This part of firm 1's reaction schedule X1 > 0 and dπ 1 0 at dx1 = 0 , = dx1 X2 , so it is optimal for firm 1 ...
... correspondence is drawn to include the > A. axis for x2 X2 is not derived from equation ( 16 ) , which only applies when This part of firm 1's reaction schedule X1 > 0 and dπ 1 0 at dx1 = 0 , = dx1 X2 , so it is optimal for firm 1 ...
Page 17
... correspondence is given by Therefore , the monopoly outcome is an equilibrium 14 when X1 = 0 . When ( 19 ) 2x2 = A + v ( X2 ) • m Let z denote the solution to ( 19 ) ; z ' is the monopoly output level . So , the outcome ( 0 , z " ) is ...
... correspondence is given by Therefore , the monopoly outcome is an equilibrium 14 when X1 = 0 . When ( 19 ) 2x2 = A + v ( X2 ) • m Let z denote the solution to ( 19 ) ; z ' is the monopoly output level . So , the outcome ( 0 , z " ) is ...
Common terms and phrases
achieving compatibility adapter assumption Asymmetric Duopoly asymmetric equilibria Avinash Dixit brand of hardware Carl Shapiro compatibility decision compatibility mechanism compatibility technology Competition consumer expectations consumer surplus consumption externalities costs of compatibility CPM operating system denote Discussion Papers Don Fullerton duopoly equal equation equilibrium is symmetric equilibrium reaction correspondence externalities are present firm 1's reaction firm's fixed costs fulfilled expectations equilibrium function given incentives for compatibility incompatibility equilibrium increase industry standard initial equilibrium joint profits Katz level of consumer level of output mainframe computer marginal consumer marginal costs market share Michael Michael L monopoly equilibrium move to compatibility natural monopoly network effects network externalities networks compatible Ordover Papers in Economics payments are feasible personal computer Princeton University Princeton private incentives products are compatible products compatible Proposition relevant network set of expectations social incentives tions total output v(y² valuations willingness to pay Woodrow Wilson School x₁ ΔΠ