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able actions advantage agreeable allowed animal appear approbation argument arise ascribe Athenians authority beauty benevolence blame cause cerning character Cicero circumstances common concerning conclusion conduct connexion consequences consider contrary course of nature creatures degree deity discover distinction divine effect endeavour entirely epic poetry Epicurus esteem evident excite experience farther favour feel former friendship give happiness Hesiod human nature ideas imagination immediately infer influence inquiry instance Jansenist ject Jupiter justice kind laws mankind manner ment merit mind miracle moral nations necessity neral never nexion object observe operation opinion origin ourselves particular passions perfect person philosophers pleasure Plutarch Polybius polytheism possessed praise present pretend principles produce qualities racter reason reflection regard relation religion render rule scepticism seems sense sensible sentiment sion society species superstition supposed Tacitus testimony theism thing thought tion tural ture vice whole Xenophon
Page 193 - When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number'} No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
Page 178 - ... able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object. The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther from it: but the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration: it was, therefore, nothing but its image, which was present to the mind. These are the obvious dictates of reason...
Page 51 - If the mind be not engaged by argument to make this step, it must be induced by some other principle of equal weight and authority; and that principle will preserve its influence as long as human nature remains the same.
Page 98 - The same motives always produce the same actions ; the same events follow from the same causes. Ambition, avarice, selflove, vanity, friendship, generosity, public spirit ; these VOL. IV. G passions, mixed in . various degrees, and distributed through society, have been, from the beginning of the world, and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprises which have ever been observed among mankind.
Page 103 - Thus it appears, not only that the conjunction between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as that between the cause and effect in any part of nature...
Page 34 - ... go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. If you were to ask a man, why he believes any matter of fact, which is absent; for instance, that his friend is in the country, or in France; he would give you a reason; and this reason would be some other fact; as a letter received from him, or the knowledge of his former resolutions and promises. A man finding a watch or any other machine in a desert island, would conclude that there had once been men in that island. All our reasonings concerning...
Page 90 - ... existed. The appearance of a cause always conveys the mind, by a customary transition, to the idea of the effect. Of this also we have experience. We may, therefore, suitably to this experience, form another definition of cause and call it an object followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys the thought to that other.
Page 435 - The whole frame of nature bespeaks an Intelligent Author; and no rational inquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism and Religion.
Page 134 - The plain consequence is — and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention, — ' That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish...