Political Game Theory: An IntroductionPolitical Game Theory is a self-contained introduction to game theory and its applications to political science. The book presents choice theory, social choice theory, static and dynamic games of complete information, static and dynamic games of incomplete information, repeated games, bargaining theory, mechanism design and a mathematical appendix covering, logic, real analysis, calculus and probability theory. The methods employed have many applications in various disciplines including comparative politics, international relations and American politics. Political Game Theory is tailored to students without extensive backgrounds in mathematics, and traditional economics, however there are also many special sections that present technical material that will appeal to more advanced students. A large number of exercises are also provided to practice the skills and techniques discussed. |
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Adam Meirowitz American Economic Review American Journal American Political Science Ann Arbor Asymmetric Information Austen-Smith Axelrod Bargaining Game Baron Barry Bayesian Cambridge University Press Choice and Welfare Condorcet Jury Theorems David Delega Discretion Econometrica Economic Behavior Economic Theory Elections Epstein Equilibrium Fearon Ferejohn Fixed Point Fudenberg Game Theory Games and Economic Games with Incomplete Gilligan Groseclose Harvard University Press Heterogeneous Committees Howard Rosenthal Incentives Incomplete Information Information and Legislative James James D Jeffrey Banks John Morgan Journal of Economic Journal of Political Journal of Public Keith Krehbiel Kenneth Krishna Mathematics McKelvey Michigan Press Multidimensional Voting Nash Nolan McCarty Optimal Auction Organization Palfrey Political Economy Political Science Review Positive Political Theory Princeton University Press Procedures Public Choice Public Economics Quarterly Journal Real Analysis Repeated Games Richard Shepsle Signaling Games Social Choice Strategic Strategy-Proofness Supermodular Thomas Timothy tion Typescript University of Michigan Veto Bargaining Vijay Voting Model Weingast Wiley York