Who Wins?: Predicting Strategic Success and Failure in Armed ConflictDespite their immense war-fighting capacity, the five most powerful states in the international system have failed to attain their primary political objective in almost 40% of their military operations against weak state and non-state targets since 1945. Why are states with tremendous military might so often unable to attain their objectives when they use force against weaker adversaries? More broadly, under what conditions can states use military force to attain their political objectives and what conditions limit the utility of military force as a policy instrument? Can we predict the outcome of a war before the fighting begins? Scholars and military leaders have argued that poor military strategy choices, domestic political constraints on democratic governments, or failure to commit sufficient resources to the war effort can explain why strong states lose small wars. In contrast, Who Wins? by Patricia L. Sullivan argues that the key to understanding strategic success in war lies in the nature of the political objectives states pursue through the use of military force. Sullvian does not deny the importance of war-fighting capacity, military strategies, or resolve as determinants of war outcomes. But she provides both a coherent argument and substantial empirical evidence that the effects of these factors are dependent on the nature of the belligerents' political objectives. The theory's predictions about the conditions under which states are able to attain their political objectives through the use of military force are tested against the most widely accepted alternative explanations of war outcomes with an abundance of historical data on violent conflicts. The results support Sullivan's argument and challenge both existing theories and conventional wisdom about the impact of factors like military strength, resolve, regime type, and war-fighting strategies on war outcomes. |
Contents
1 Introduction | 3 |
2 Strength and Resolve in the Armed Conflicts We Observe | 19 |
3 War Aims and War Outcomes | 44 |
4 Testing the Argument | 66 |
5 Interstate Dispute Outcomes 19192001 | 91 |
At What Price Victory? | 106 |
7 Conclusion | 127 |
Appendix to Chapter 4 | 135 |
Appendix to Chapter 6 | 141 |
Notes | 143 |
| 157 | |
| 167 | |
Other editions - View all
Who Wins?: Predicting Strategic Success and Failure in Armed Conflict Patricia Sullivan Limited preview - 2012 |
Who Wins?: Predicting Strategic Success and Failure in Armed Conflict Patricia Sullivan No preview available - 2012 |
Common terms and phrases
achieve adversary's Afghanistan Air Power American armed conflict armed forces Asymmetric Conflict asymmetric wars attrition battle brute-force objectives brute-force war aim casualties chapter coalition coded coercive objectives Correlates of War cost-tolerance advantage cost-tolerance threshold dataset defense denial strategy destructive capacity destructive-capacity advantage dispute escalation dispute initiator dyad employ enemy fighting foreign regime ground troops Gulf hypotheses initiator's insurgents intervening state's intervention success Iraq Iraq's Iraqi issues at stake Kadera Kosovo Kuwait leaders maintain major power military measure Militarized Interstate Disputes military capabilities military effectiveness military force military operations military strategy MIPS nonstate actors Operation Desert Storm opponent percent policy change power military interventions predicted probability prevail primary political objective punishment strategy regime change resolve Saddam Saddam Hussein salience South Vietnam Stam target compliance territory theory tolerance for costs United variable indicating Vietnam Vietnam War war aims war outcomes war-fighting capacity weak actors