The Myth of Mr Butskell: The Politics of British Economic Policy, 1950-55
It is often assumed that a general consensus existed between the post-war Labour and Conservative governments in matters of economic policy. This book provides a systematic challenge to this view by examining the economic policy of Hugh Gaitskell from 1950 to 1955. Through a careful examination of the evidence, it is demonstrated that contrary to the prevailing view of this period, there was no consensus about the extent to which the economy should be controlled and how it should be managed, and that there was a sustained argument over the use of physical controls, monetary policy and direct taxation.
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The Changing Structure of Economic
The Treasury View
The Wider Economic Policy Network
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advisers agreement Alec argued arguments balance of payments Bank of England Bank Rate Board of Trade British budgetary policy Butskell Cabinet Cairncross Chancellor Chancellorship Cherwell Churchill Churchill's Cobbold Collective Approach Commons Debates Commonwealth Conservative Party convertibility Cripps Dalton decontrol diary Douglas Jay economic controls economic planning Economic Section Economist effect Exchequer external economic policy favour fiscal policy floating rate food subsidies full employment Full Employment Bill Gaitskell and Butler Gaitskell's GATT Government's Harold Wilson House of Commons Hugh Gaitskell Ibid Imperial Preference important increase inflation interest rates investment Keynesian Labour Government Labour Party Leslie Rowan London Macmillan meant memorandum Ministry Ministry of Supply monetary policy noted objective Organisation Permanent Secretary Peter Thorneycroft physical controls Plowden political postwar problem proposals Rab Butler relationship responsibility Robert Hall ROBOT plan role Rowan Seldon socialist speech Sterling Area tariff taxation Thorneycroft Treasury's wrote