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action amongst appear assent bishop of Worcester body capable cause CHAP clear and distinct colours complex ideas conceive consciousness consider desire determined discourse distance distinct ideas distinguish doubt duration eternity evident exist extension faculties farther figure finite happiness hath idea of infinite idea of space idea of substance imagine imprinted infinity innate ideas innate principles Julian period knowledge liberty lordship mankind measure memory men's mind mixed modes motion move names nature neral never objects observe operations perceive perception perhaps personal identity pleasure and pain positive idea primary qualities produce propositions prove reason receive resurrection sensation and reflection sensation or reflection senses sensible qualities sidered signify simple ideas sleep Socrates soever solidity sort soul speak spirit stand substratum suppose taken notice thing thoughts tion truth understanding uneasiness volition whereby wherein whereof whilst words
Page 87 - ... bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense.
Page 152 - For wit lying most in the assemblage of ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy; judgment, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in separating carefully, one from another, ideas wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by similitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another.
Page 14 - It is an established opinion amongst some men, that there are in the understanding certain innate principles; some primary notions, Koival (.wouu, characters, as it were stamped upon the mind of man, which the soul receives in its very first being, and brings into the world with it.
Page 2 - I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind; or trouble myself to examine wherein its essence consists; or by what motions of our spirits or alterations of our bodies we come to have any sensation by our organs, or any ideas in our understandings; and whether those ideas do in their formation, any or all of them, depend on matter or not.
Page 345 - God and separate spirits, are made up of the simple ideas we receive from reflection : vg having, from what we experiment in ourselves, got the ideas of existence and duration, of knowledge and power, of pleasure and happiness, and of several other qualities and powers, which it is better to have, than to be without ; when we would frame an idea the most suitable we can to the Supreme Being, we enlarge every one of these with our idea of infinity ; and so putting them together, make our complex idea...
Page 126 - If, then, external objects be not united to our minds when they produce ideas therein, and yet we perceive these original qualities in such of them as singly fall under our senses, it is evident that some motion must be thence continued by our nerves or animal spirits, by some parts of our bodies, to the brain or the seat of sensation, there to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of them.
Page 85 - ... whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness, and others : it is in the first place then to be inquired, how he comes by them...
Page 249 - This power which the mind has thus to order the consideration of any idea, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and vice versa, in any particular instance: is that which we call the will. The actual exercise of that power, by directing any particular action, or its forbearance, is that which we call volition or willing.
Page 87 - The understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas which it doth not receive from one of these two. External objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us; and the mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations.
Page 3 - I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension ; to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities.