The Strategy of Endings: War Termination in Conventional and Nuclear Worlds |
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Contents
War Termination 1 | 60 |
Strategy and the Ending | 126 |
Nuclear Deterrence and War Termination | 185 |
2 other sections not shown
Common terms and phrases
absolute weapons adversary American argued arms races assumed assumptions attack Bernard Brodie capability Carl von Clausewitz Cimbala Clausewitz command and control concept concessions context conventional and nuclear conventional wars conventional weapons cooperation countervalue credible Cuban Missile Crisis decision makers defeat defense destruction deterrence fails doctrines effective enemy environments escalation favorable fighting Ikle interests international politics International Security Jomini Jominian Kenneth Waltz limited nuclear Michael Howard military contest military strategy nuclear age nuclear conflict nuclear deterrence nuclear force nuclear means nuclear options nuclear strategy nuclear violence nuclear war termination nuclear weapons opponent peace political objectives possible post-deterrence primary deterrence problem relative outcome relative weapons retaliation risks Robert Jervis scenario Schelling Schlieffen Plan secondary deterrence security dilemma side situation Soviet Union strategic analysis strategic ideas strategic image strategic thinking strikes suggests superpowers surrender symbolic targets theory Thomas Schelling UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA victory war termination warfare York