Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine

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John Wiley & Sons, Mar 30, 2009 - Philosophy - 400 pages
In this major new work, Matthew Kramer seeks to establish two main conclusions. On the one hand, moral requirements are strongly objective. On the other hand, the objectivity of ethics is itself an ethical matter that rests primarily on ethical considerations. Moral realism - the doctrine that morality is indeed objective - is a moral doctrine.
  • Major new volume in our new series New Directions in Ethics
  • Takes on the big picture - defending the objectivity of ethics whilst rejecting the grounds of much of the existing debate between realists and anti-realists
  • Cuts across both ethical theory and metaethics
  • Distinguished by the quality of the scholarship and its ambitious range
 

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Contents

Preface
vii
Chapter 1 Introduction
1
Chapter 2 MindIndependence
23
Chapter 3 Determinate Correctness
86
Chapter 4 Uniform Applicability
129
Chapter 5 Invariance
152
Chapter 6 Transindividual Concurrence
173
Chapter 7 Impartiality
214
Chapter 8 Tr ut h Apt i t ude
259
Chapter 9 Further Dimensions of Ethical Objectivity?
289
Chapter 10 Supervenience as an Ethical Phenomenon
304
References
365
Index
375
Copyright

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About the author (2009)

Matthew H. Kramer is Professor of Legal and Political Philosophy at the University of Cambridge; Fellow of Churchill College, Cambridge; and Director of the Cambridge Forum for Legal & Political Philosophy. His many previous books include The Quality of Freedom (2003); Where Law and Morality Meet (2004); and Objectivity and the Rule of Law (2007). He is also a co-editor of three books, most recently Freedom: A Philosophical Anthology (Blackwell, 2007); and The Legacy of H.L.A. Hart: Legal, Political, and Moral Philosophy (2008). His work covers many areas of moral, political, and legal philosophy.

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