Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine
In this major new work, Matthew Kramer seeks to establish two main conclusions. On the one hand, moral requirements are strongly objective. On the other hand, the objectivity of ethics is itself an ethical matter that rests primarily on ethical considerations. Moral realism - the doctrine that morality is indeed objective - is a moral doctrine.
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abstract affirmative aleatory anti-realist argument assertions babies for pleasure basic moral principles Blackburn cannibalism causal inefficacy Chapter claims contents correct principles counterfactual determinately correct answers disagreements distinction domain of morality Dworkin empirical epistemic epistemology example existence fact genuinely Hare Hare’s human Humean ideal identity of indiscernibles impartiality impermissible incommensurability indeterminacy Kalderon Law of Noncontradiction linguistic-conceptual logical meta-ethical moral agents moral beliefs moral convictions moral cruxes moral doctrine moral duty moral judgments moral matter moral necessity moral power moral properties moral questions moral realism moral relationships moral relativism moral relativists moral requirements moral skeptics moral standards moral status moral values morally obligated morally permissible noncognitivists normative one’s people’s person philosophers position precept principles of morality proposition realists reasons relativists relevant response-centered theorists Shafer-Landau situation strong existential mind-independence strongly mind-independent substantive ethical substantive moral supervenience thesis things tion torturing babies transindividual concurrence truth uniquely correct universalizability value-pluralism wrong