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admit affections animal Aristotle authority beauty become chap character claim conception conflict conscience constitutes Cudworth Descartes difference distinction Divine doctrine duty elements essence evil experience expression external F. H. Bradley fact faculty feeling force former Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi function give happiness hedonism hedonistic Herbert Spencer higher human Hutcheson Ibid idea impulse individual inner instinct intellectual intuitive J. S. Mill James Mill lative latter Leslie Stephen less means merit mind moral consciousness moral constitution moral judgment moral sense moral sentiments motive nature never object obligation ourselves outward pain passion perception phenomena Plato pleasure possible present principle Professor Green Prudence prudential psychology reason recognise regard relation relative reverence right and wrong rule scale Science of Ethics self-consciousness sentient simply social spontaneous springs of action theory things thought tion true truth Utilitarian virtue whole word
Page 303 - Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do.
Page 12 - Va^asaneyi-saOThitaupanishad. ) cu. 6d. Vol. II. The Sacred Laws of the Aryas, as taught in the Schools of Apastamba, Gautama, Vasishrta, and Baudhayana. Translated by Prof. Georg Biihler. Part I. Apastamba and Gautama, los. 6d. Vol. III. The Sacred Books of China. The Texts of Confucianism.
Page 306 - ... pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.
Page 316 - Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures: no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs.
Page 330 - I must again repeat, what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.
Page 172 - Let them melt away as waters which run continually: when he bendeth his bow to shoot his arrows, let them be as cut in pieces.
Page 316 - ... the test of quality, and the rule for measuring it against quantity, being the preference felt by those who, in their opportunities of experience, to which must be added their habits of self-consciousness and selfobservation, are best furnished with the means of comparison.
Page 308 - I may therefore conclude that the passion of laughter is nothing else but sudden glory arising from some sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly...
Page 306 - I believe that these sources of evidence, impartially consulted, will declare that desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable or rather two parts of the same phenomenon; in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same psychological fact...
Page 307 - ... to think of an object as desirable (unless for the sake of its consequences) and to think of it as pleasant are one and the same thing; and that to desire anything except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical impossibility.