Playing for Real: A Text on Game Theory

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Oxford University Press, Mar 29, 2007 - Business & Economics - 656 pages
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Ken Binmore's previous game theory textbook, Fun and Games (D.C. Heath, 1991), carved out a significant niche in the advanced undergraduate market; it was intellectually serious and more up-to-date than its competitors, but also accessibly written. Its central thesis was that game theory allows us to understand many kinds of interactions between people, a point that Binmore amply demonstrated through a rich range of examples and applications. This replacement for the now out-of-date 1991 textbook retains the entertaining examples, but changes the organization to match how game theory courses are actually taught, making Playing for Real a more versatile text that almost all possible course designs will find easier to use, with less jumping about than before. In addition, the problem sections, already used as a reference by many teachers, have become even more clever and varied, without becoming too technical. Playing for Real will sell into advanced undergraduate courses in game theory, primarily those in economics, but also courses in the social sciences, and serve as a reference for economists.
 

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Contents

Getting Locked In
3
Backing Up
39
Taking Chances
77
Accounting for Tastes
111
Planning Ahead
143
Mixing Things Up
177
Fighting It Out
215
Keeping Your Balance
253
Keeping Up to Date
383
Seeking Refinement
407
Knowing What to Believe
431
Getting Together
459
Cutting a Deal
493
Teaming Up
521
Just Playing?
543
Taking Charge
567

Buying Cheap
273
Selling Dear
299
Repeating Yourself
319
Getting the Message
353
Going Going Gone
593
Index
631
Copyright

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About the author (2007)

Ken Binmore is a mathematician-turned-economist who has devoted his life to the theory of games and its applications in economics, evolutionary biology, psychology, and moral philosophy. He is well known for his part in designing the telecom auction that raised $35 billion for the British taxpayer, but his major research contributions are to the theory of bargaining and its testing in the laboratory. He is a Fellow of the British Academy and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He is the author of 12 books and some 90 research papers. He is Emeritus Professor of Economics at University College London.

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