Playing for Real: A Text on Game Theory
Ken Binmore's previous game theory textbook, Fun and Games (D.C. Heath, 1991), carved out a significant niche in the advanced undergraduate market; it was intellectually serious and more up-to-date than its competitors, but also accessibly written. Its central thesis was that game theory allows us to understand many kinds of interactions between people, a point that Binmore amply demonstrated through a rich range of examples and applications. This replacement for the now out-of-date 1991 textbook retains the entertaining examples, but changes the organization to match how game theory courses are actually taught, making Playing for Real a more versatile text that almost all possible course designs will find easier to use, with less jumping about than before. In addition, the problem sections, already used as a reference by many teachers, have become even more clever and varied, without becoming too technical. Playing for Real will sell into advanced undergraduate courses in game theory, primarily those in economics, but also courses in the social sciences, and serve as a reference for economists.
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Accounting for Tastes
Mixing Things Up
Fighting It Out
Keeping Your Balance
Keeping Up to Date
Knowing What to Believe
Cutting a Deal
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actors Adam and Eve Adam’s Alice and Bob Alice’s assumption auction backward induction bargaining problem Bayesian Bayesian game behavior best reply Bob and Carol Bob’s buyers chance moves choice choose coalition common knowledge conﬁrm convex cooperative cost Cournot deﬁned demand curve Dilemma dollar duopoly economists Edgeworth box efﬁcient Eve’s example expected payoff ﬁnd ﬁnite ﬁrm ﬁrst game of Figure game theory II’s indifference curves inﬁnite information set lottery maximize mixed strategy Nash bargaining solution Nash equilibrium Neumann and Morgenstern optimal Pandora Pareto payoff matrix payoff pair payoff region payoff table play hawk player I’s possible preferences Prisoners probability proﬁle proﬁt pure strategy rational players reaction curves repeated game satisﬁes Section security strategy shows simpliﬁed strategic form strongly dominated subgame subgame-perfect equilibrium theorem theorists valuation vector Vickrey auction Walrasian Walrasian equilibrium weakly dominated strategies winning zero