A Theory of Customary International Law |
Common terms and phrases
action ambassador belligerent bilateral prisoner's dilemma bilateral repeat prisoner's blockade Boer British capture CIL norm CIL rule civilian fishing claim coastal fishing vessels coercion coincidence of interest compliance conception of CIL consistent contexts contraband Coogan coordination game Customary International Law Declaration of Paris diplomatic immunity domestic Duncan Snidal economic enemy property enforcement engage England equilibrium evidence example exemption exogenous explain fishery FSFG principle game theory human rights law Int'l international behavioral regularities international human rights iterated prisoner's dilemma Jessup legal obligation Louis Henkin maritime military multilateral national interest navies neutral ships norm of CIL opinio juris Paquete Habana payoffs Posner powerful practice promises property on neutral refrain from seizing repeat prisoner's dilemma retaliation Riesenfeld rule of CIL Russo-Japanese War seizing fishing vessels sense of legal state's strategy supra note ___ territorial sea theory of CIL threat three miles three-mile rule traditional account treaties United violate CIL William Edward Hall