The Significance of Free WillIn the past quarter-century, there has been a resurgence of interest in traditional philosophical questions about free will. The first of this book's aims is to explore the significance of this recent work, both for the advancement of understanding in one of philosophy's most perennially challenging areas, and for broad contemporary concerns in ethics, politics, science, religion, and humanistic studies. The book's second goal is to defend a classic "incompatibilist" or "libertarian" conception of free will in ways that are both new to philosophy and that respond to contemporary scientific learning. Incompatibilist or libertarian accounts of freedom are often criticized for being unintelligible or for having no place in the modern scientific picture of the world. Kane asserts to the contrary that a traditional view of free will (one that insists upon the incompatibility of free will and determinism) can be supported without the usual appeals to obscure or mysterious forms of agency and can be reconciled with recent developments in the sciences - physical, biological, neurological, cognitive, and behavioral. |
Contents
1 Introduction | 3 |
Compatibility and Significance | 19 |
Intelligibility and Existence | 103 |
Notes | 217 |
| 243 | |
| 259 | |
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Common terms and phrases
accounts of free agent agent-causation argued behavior behavioral engineers believe Berofsky brain causal cause chapter character and motives choices or actions choices or decisions choose circumstances CNC control Compatibility Question compulsion conflict Consequence Argument Daniel Dennett Dennett desires discussion efforts Epicurean example explain Frankfurt free actions Free Agency Principle Galen Strawson Ginet Hawaii Hobbes incommensurable incompatibilism incompatibilist free indeterminacy indeterminist intentions Inwagen laws of nature libertarian free Mark Bernstein Mele Michael Bratman moral and prudential moral or prudential moral responsibility nonoccurrent causation notion occur one's otherwise outcome past persons Peter van Inwagen philosophers plural rationality plural voluntary control plurality conditions practical reasoning problem prudential choice quantum quantum indeterminacy reasons or motives render false role satisfied self-forming self-network selfhood sense SFAs SFWs Strawson sustaining purposes Taoist theories things tion ultimate responsibility underived origination value pluralism volitions voluntarily Walden