Engel argues that, although the minimalist conception of truth is basically right, it does not follow that truth can be eliminated from our philosophical thinking, as is claimed by some radical deflationists. In particular, he shows that some deflationist views have a definitively relativist and "postmodernist" ring and should be rejected. Even if a metaphysically substantive theory of truth has little chance to succeed, he argues, truth plays a central role as a norm or guiding value of our rational inquiries and practices in the philosophy of knowledge and in ethics.
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accept aim at truth analytic philosophers anti-realism anti-realist argument belief called claim cognitive cognitivism cognitivist coherence coherentism conception of truth contemporary correspondence Davidson defended definition of truth deflationary deflationism deflationist discourse disquotational schema distinct domain Dummett enquiry entities epistemic epistemology Euthyphro express expressivism expressivist fact formulate Frege hence Horwich idea ideal identity theory implies instance intuition issues judgements justification kind knowledge language Lizzie Borden logical matter meaning metaphorical metaphysical minimal realism minimalist Moore's paradox moral norm of truth notion of truth objects ontology platitudes pragmatism predicate principle of bivalence problem Putnam question realist/anti-realist reality relation relativism relativist role Rorty seems semantic sense sentences snow is white sort substantive superassertibility talk Tarski's theoretical theory of truth thesis things thought tion Torture is wrong true iff true or false truth conditions truth-aptness truth-bearers truth-maker truth-predicate verificationism verificationist warranted assertibility Wittgenstein word true Wright