Preferences and Well-BeingPreferences are often thought to be relevant for well-being: respecting preferences, or satisfying them, contributes in some way to making people's lives go well for them. A crucial assumption that accompanies this conviction is that there is a normative standard that allows us to discriminate between preferences that do, and those that do not, contribute to well-being. The papers collected in this volume, written by moral philosophers and philosophers of economics, explore a number of central issues concerning the formulation of such a normative standard. They examine what a defensible account of how preferences should be formed for them to contribute to well-being should look like; whether preferences are subject to requirements of rationality and what reasons we have to prefer certain things over others; and what the significance is, if any, of preferences that are arational or not conducive to well-being. |
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
Preference Formation and Personal Good | 33 |
On WellBeing | 65 |
WellBeing Adaptation and Human Limitations | 83 |
Consequentialism and Preference Formation in Economics | 111 |
Preferences Deliberation and Satisfaction | 131 |
ContentRelated and AttitudeRelated Reasons | 155 |
Reasoning with Preferences? | 183 |
Taking Unconsidered Preferences Seriously | 209 |
Preferences Paternalism and Liberty | 233 |
Preference Change and Interpersonal Comparisons | 265 |
Common terms and phrases
according achievement action actual adaptation agent alternative analysis apple approach argument attitude attitude-related reasons autonomy believe better capacities choice choose claim conception concern consider course decision default deliberation depend desire develop discussion dominated effects example expected express extended fact figure function give given hold human idea ideal important individual intention interest involves judgement kind lead least less limited lives matter means moral nature normative objective one's options outcomes Oxford parents particular people's person Philosophy play Player position possible preferences present problem proposition question rational reflect regard relation relevant represent requirement respect role rule satisfaction satisfy second-order seems sense simply situation social sort standard strategy suggests Suppose theory things understand University Press utility valuable welfare well-being worth
Bibliographic information
| Title | Preferences and Well-Being Volume 59 of Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, Royal Institute of Philosophy London |
| Author | Royal Institute of Philosophy. Annual Conference |
| Editors | Serena Olsaretti, Richard J. Arneson |
| Contributor | St. John's College (University of Cambridge) |
| Edition | illustrated, reprint |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press, 2006 |
| ISBN | 0521695589, 9780521695589 |
| Length | 279 pages |
| Subjects | › Philosophy / General Philosophy / Political |
| Export Citation | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |