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Aristotle on Fallacies: Or, the Sophistici Elenchi, with a Tr. and Notes by ...
No preview available - 2015
6yov accident ambiguous Analytica answerer argument Aristotle avTb avTov axiom conclusion confutation contradiction Coriscus definition dialectic dSvvaTov dXXd dyaObv eaTi eaTiv eivai elvai enstasis eo~Ti eristic eXeyyos eyei fallacy fallacy of composition false fiev fiev ovv fifj firj genus ignoratio elenchi irapa irapd irdvTes irepl irpbs irpbs tov irpos Kal tov Kal yap KaOoXov KaTa loci method minor premiss napd nepl npbs oiov olov oTav oTov ov yap ovbe ovSev ovtcos ovtos p.ev paralogisms paronyms pirastic predicate principles proof proposition prove question reasoning respondent solecism solution sophism sophistic syllogism TavTa TavTb tcov term Tfjs theorems thesis tion tivos to>v tois Topica tov Xoyov tovto Tr)v Trjs true tS>v tt)v ttjs ttjv words Xeyeiv Xoyos yivos
Page 225 - If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon.
Page 224 - Then we may reason thus : b and c are not effects of A, for they were not produced by it in the second experiment; nor are d and e, for they were not produced in the first. Whatever is really the effect of A must have been produced in both instances ; now this condition is fulfilled by no circumstance except a.
Page 224 - A general proposition inductively obtained is only then proved to be true, when the instances on which it rests are such that if they have been correctly observed, the falsity of the generalization would be inconsistent with the constancy of causation ; with the universality of the fact that the phenomena of nature take place according to invariable laws of succession.* It is probable, therefore, that M.
Page 225 - The method of agreement stands on the ground that whatever can be eliminated is not connected with the phenomenon by any law. The method of difference has for its foundation that whatever cannot be eliminated is connected with the phenomenon by a law.
Page 225 - Agreement, we endeavoured to obtain instances which agreed in the given circumstance but differed in every other: in the present method we require, on the contrary, two instances resembling one another in every other respect, but differing in the presence or absence of the phenomenon we wish to study.
Page 223 - The casual circumstances being thus eliminated, if only one remains, that one is the cause which we are in search of: if more than one, they either are, or contain among them, the cause: and so, mutatis mutandis, of the effect. As this method proceeds by comparing different instances to ascertain in what they agree, I have termed it the Method of Agreement: and we may adopt as its regulating principle the following canon...
Page 225 - The axioms implied in this method are evidently the following: whatever antecedent cannot be excluded without preventing the phenomenon is the cause, or a condition, of that phenomenon; whatever consequent can be excluded, with no other difference in the antecedents than the absence of a particular one, is the effect of that one.
Page 225 - Instead of comparing different instances of a phenomenon to discover in what they agree, this method compares an instance of its occurrence with an instance of its non-occurrence to discover in what they differ.
Page 223 - Whatever circumstance can be excluded, without prejudice to the phenomenon, or can be absent notwithstanding its presence, is not connected with it in the way of causation. The casual circumstances being thus eliminated, if only one remains, that one is the cause which we are in search of: if more than one, they either are, or contain among them, the cause: and so, mutatis mutandis, of the effect. As this...