Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption and Virtue
In previous years, philosophers have either ignored the virtue of humility or found it to be in need of radical redefinition. But humility is a central human virtue, and it is the purpose of this book to defend that claim from a Kantian point of view. Jeanine Grenberg argues that we can indeed speak of Aristotelian-style, but still deeply Kantian, virtuous character traits. She proposes moving from focus on action to focus on person, not leaving the former behind, but instead taking it up within a larger, more satisfying Kantian moral theory. Using examples from literature as well as philosophy, she shows that there is a Kantian virtue theory to be explored in which humility plays a central role. Her book will have a wide appeal to readers not only in Kant studies but also in theological ethics and moral psychology.
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Dependent and corrupt rational agency
Constraints on any possible Kantian account of virtue
A Kantian account of virtue
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The Kantian virtue of humility
Humility and selfrespect
The humble person
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accept account of humility account of virtue admit affirm Allison Alyosha appeal appreciation Aristotle assertion avoid awareness of one's belief beneficence Brothers Karamazov capable and dignified capacity chapter character traits claim comparative-competitive concern condition consider constraint corrupt but capable Corruption Thesis dependent and corrupt derivative self-knowledge dignity Dostoevsky equal example fact finite agent ground human agents human nature humble person imperfect duties inferiority internalization judgments Kant Kant's Kantian account Kantian virtue maxim meta-attitude modesty moral agent moral disposition moral exemplars moral feeling moral law moral principles motives necessary O'Neill O'Neill's obligatory end one's agency one's character one's limits one's moral one's worth oneself perfect perspective possible proper pursuit of happiness pursuit of self-love radical evil rational agent reason recognition self-respect recognize reflections reject self-other comparison self-worth sense Snegirev social sort Statman Stoic superiority tendency understanding unity value of moral virtue ethics virtuous disposition worthlessness Zosima