The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1
Roger D. Congleton, Bernard N. Grofman, Stefan Voigt
Oxford University Press, Jan 8, 2019 - Business & Economics - 984 pages
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice provides a comprehensive overview of the research in economics, political science, law, and sociology that has generated considerable insight into the politics of democratic and authoritarian systems as well as the influence of different institutional frameworks on incentives and outcomes. The result is an improved understanding of public policy, public finance, industrial organization, and macroeconomics as the combination of political and economic analysis shed light on how various interests compete both within a given rules of the games and, at times, to change the rules. These volumes include analytical surveys, syntheses, and general overviews of the many subfields of public choice focusing on interesting, important, and at times contentious issues. Throughout the focus is on enhancing understanding how political and economic systems act and interact, and how they might be improved.
Both volumes combine methodological analysis with substantive overviews of key topics. This first volume covers voting and elections; interest group competition and rent seeking, including corruption and various normative approaches to evaluating policies and politics.
Throughout both volumes important analytical concepts and tools are discussed, including their application to substantive topics. Readers will gain increased understanding of rational choice and its implications for collective action; various explanations of voting, including economic and expressive; the role of taxation and finance in government dynamics; how trust and persuasion influence political outcomes; and how revolution, coups, and authoritarianism can be explained by the same set of analytical tools as enhance understanding of the various forms of democracy.
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VOTING AND ELECTIONS
A Modeling Collective Choice in Voting
B Spatial Voting Models
C Other Aspects of Voter and Party Choice
D Democracy in Practice
INTEREST GROUP POLITICS AND RENT SEEKING
Other editions - View all
agents aggregate allocation alternatives American Political Science analysis assumption behavior benefits Bernard Grofman Borda count Calculus of Consent Cambridge University Press campaign candidate choose coalition collective action committee competition Congleton constitutional contest contractarian contributions corruption cost cues decision democracy democratic dimension discussion Downsian Economic Theory economic voting Edward Elgar effects election electoral empirical envy-freeness equation equilibrium example fair division function Gordon Tullock Grofman ideal point ideology incentives increase individual institutions interest groups issues Journal of Economic Journal of Political leader legislators Lewis-Beck literature logrolling majority rule maximize median voter Nash equilibrium normative Olson optimal outcomes party percent players Political Economy Political Science position problem proposed public choice public choice theory rational choice regulation rent seeking result share Social Choice social democracy social trust spatial model strategic voting studies theorem tion turnout utility valence voting rule welfare winning