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actions affections Andres angebornen Ansicht approbation Atheisten autres Begriff beiden bestimmt Bewusstseyn blosse body c'est call cause Chapt Clarke Complex Condillac d'Alembert daher David Hume Deismus Denken deswegen Diderot eben effect eigentlich einfachen Ideen Empfindung Empirismus endlich Erkenntniss erst être existence fait first Gegenstand Geist geistigen gewisse gibt good Gott great Grund Handlung happiness Helvetius hommes Hume Ibid idea idées indem Inhärenz innate itzt Jahre John Locke knowledge Körper l'ame l'homme l'on Leibnitz lich Locke make Materialismus Menschen Mettrie mind moral muss n'est natural nature Neigungen nothwendig notions objects particular passions perception peut Philosophie pleasure point power Princip proposition qu'elle qu'il qualities reason reasoning Reflexion Religion Samuel Clarke Satz Seele Selbstliebe sensation sense seyn Shaftesbury simple ideas Sinn sinnlichen soul sowol Standpunkt Subject substance Thätigkeit Theil things tion tout true truth understanding unsere Verhältniss Vernunft verschiednen Verstand viel Voltaire Wahrheit Werk Wesen wirklich wohl Worte
Page lxxvi - If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number'} No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
Page xi - Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper,* void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer in one word, from experience...
Page iv - It being that term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking; and I could not avoid frequently using it.
Page lxx - Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality.
Page lxx - ALL the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation, which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain.
Page xi - This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself, and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it and might properly enough be called internal sense.
Page xvi - But as the mind is wholly passive in the reception of all its simple ideas, so it exerts several acts of its own, whereby out of its simple ideas, as the materials and foundations of the rest, the other are framed. The acts of the mind wherein it exerts its power over its simple ideas...
Page xi - And thus we come by those ideas we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities; which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions. This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call sensation.
Page lxx - In short, all the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward sentiment : The mixture and composition of these belongs alone to the mind and will : Or, to express myself in philosophical language, all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones.
Page lxxi - When it is asked, What is the nature of all our reasonings concerning matter of fact? the proper answer seems to be, that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect. When again it is asked, What is the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning that relation? it may be replied in one word, experience.