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abnormal adaptation aggregates amnesia animal assimilated association autocatalysis become central cess character chology complex compound consciousness definite desultory disaggregation dissociated ence epilepsy ergy existence experience external environment external reality fact function give rise hallucinations holds true hypnoidic hypnosis hypothesis ical idea individual intensity manifested material matter mechanical memory ment mental activity metaphysical mind modification moment-consciousness motor reactions movements natural selection nature ness neuron normal nuclear elements nucleus ontogenesis ontogenetic organism patient percept perience phenomena phylogenetic physiological processes postulates present primary psychic process psycho-physiological psychology psychopathic psychosis recognition reflex regarded relation representation representative elements reproduction reserve energy sciousness secondary sensations secondary sensory elements sense sense-organ sensori-motor sory stage standpoint stim stimulus stream of consciousness subconscious synthesis synthetic synthetic consciousness term theory thought threshold tion uncon unconscious unity visual vorticella Weber's law whole
Page 125 - But our ideas being nothing but actual perceptions in the mind, which cease to be any thing when there is no perception of them, this laying up of our ideas in the repository of the memory signifies no more but this, that the mind has a power in many cases to revive perceptions which it has once had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it has had them before.
Page 125 - Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper,* void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer in one word, from experience...
Page 392 - consciousness" exists seems so absurd on the face of it — for undeniably "thoughts" do exist — that I fear some readers will follow me no farther. Let me then immediately explain that I mean only to deny that the word stands for an entity, but to insist most emphatically that it does stand for a function.
Page 282 - The minutest incidents of childhood, or forgotten scenes of later years, were often revived : I could not be said to recollect them ; for if I had been told of them when waking, I should not have been able to acknowledge them as parts of my past experience. But placed as they were before me, in dreams like intuitions, and clothed in all their evanescent circumstances and accompanying feelings, I recognised them instantaneously.
Page 125 - Latins call imagination, from the image made in seeing, and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it fancy, which signifies appearance, and is as proper to one sense as to another. Imagination, therefore, is nothing but decaying sense; and is found in men and many other living creatures, as well sleeping as waking.
Page 125 - Our observation employed either, about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the MATERIALS of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.
Page 121 - Perception is that process by which the mind, after discriminating and identifying a sense-impression (simple or complex) supplements it by an accompaniment or escort of revived sensations, the whole aggregate of actual and revived sensations being solidified or integrated into the form of a percept — that is.
Page 393 - I account for all such facts by calling this whole train of experiences unreal, a mental train. Mental fire is what won't burn real sticks; mental water is what won't necessarily (though of course it may) put out even a mental fire. Mental knives may be sharp, but they won't cut real wood. Mental triangles are pointed, but their points won't wound. With 'real...
Page 392 - My thesis is that if we start with the supposition that there is only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we call that stuff 'pure experience...
Page 123 - More than this we cannot say; we certainly ought not to say what usually is said by psychologists, and treat the perception as a sum of distinct psychic entities, the present sensation namely, plus a lot of images from the past, all "integrated" together in a way impossible to describe.