The Analysis of mindG. Allen & Unwin Limited, 1921 - 310 pages |
Common terms and phrases
abstract according accuracy actions actual æther analysis analysis of mind animals appearances associated behaviour behaviourist belief belief-feeling brain called causal laws cause cerning characteristic colour concerned connected consciousness consists constitutes correlated define definition desire discomfort distinction distinguish dualism effects emotions engram example existence fact false feeling habit happens Hume's principle ideas inferred instance instinct introspection judgment kind Knight Dunlap knowledge laws of physics lecture logical meaning memory memory-belief memory-image mental occurrences merely Mneme mnemic causation mnemic phenomena namely nature objective reference particular past experience past occurrence perception physical laws physical object physical world physiological Plato precise present proposition prototype psychology purely question regard relation remember RUSKIN HOUSE seems self-evidence Semon sensations and images sensations of sight sense similar Socrates sort speaking specious present stimulus supposed theory thing thought tion true truth vague visual wholly wish words
Popular passages
Page 23 - consciousness' exists seems so absurd on the face of it — for undeniably 'thoughts' do exist — that I fear some readers will follow me no farther. Let me then immediately explain that I mean only to deny that the word stands for an entity, but to insist most emphatically that it does stand for a function. There is, I mean, no aboriginal stuff or quality of being, contrasted with that of which material objects are made, out of which our thoughts of them are made...
Page 217 - By observing how ideas become general, we may the better judge how words are made so. And here it is to be noted that I do not deny absolutely there are general ideas, but only that there are any abstract general ideas...
Page 147 - I am thane of Cawdor: If good, why do I yield to that suggestion Whose horrid image doth unfix my hair And make my seated heart knock at my ribs, Against the use of nature?
Page 278 - My theory, on the contrary, is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion. Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect...
Page 23 - My thesis is that if we start with the supposition that there is only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we call that stuff "pure experience...
Page 216 - If it may be doubted, whether beasts compound and enlarge their ideas that way, to any degree: this, I think, I may be positive in, that the power of abstracting is not at all in them; and that the having of general ideas, is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes; and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain to.
Page 22 - consciousness,' when once it has evaporated to this estate of pure diaphaneity, is on the point of disappearing altogether. It is the name of a nonentity, and has no right to a place among first principles. Those who still cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumor left behind by the disappearing ' soul
Page 216 - ... a distance. For, if they have any ideas at all, and are not bare machines (as some would have them), we cannot deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me that they do, some of them, in certain instances reason as that they have sense ; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they receive them from their senses. They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction."—" Essay on Human Understanding,
Page 215 - I own myself able to abstract in one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which though they are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist without them.
Page 146 - ... appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse, excepting only those which arise from the sight and touch and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion. I believe it will not be very necessary to employ many words in explaining this distinction. Every one of himself will readily perceive the difference betwixt feeling and thinking. The common degrees...